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Abstract
This thesis aims to show the significance the power to define may have. It analyzes the policy 
process and policy outcomes regarding the status, treatment and form of trial given to the 
“enemy combatants” during the George W. Bush administration and the War on Terror, and 
how the Bush administration used its power to define with relative success. The analysis is 
provided by a close reading of four documents central to the policy process. The four 
documents are two memoranda from within the executive branch, a presidential signing 
statement, and an executive order. The policy choices made and the degree the Bush 
administration used its power to define proved to have significant consequences for the 
balance of power between the three branches of government, and for the “enemy combatants.” 
By applying three theories on the policy process, the analyzed documents and their context 
the thesis attempts to find if the theories may provide additional insight into how George W. 
Bush ran the executive branch, and why the policy outcomes turned out as they did.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Bush declared a “War 
on Terror” which led to the invasion of two Middle Eastern countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The two wars led to an influx of prisoners held by the United States’ military and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, most prominently in the prison facilities at Guantanamo Bay, the Abu 
Ghraib prison outside Baghdad and in secret CIA-operated prisons in several undisclosed 
locations around the world. The influx of prisoners and a need to prevent further terrorist 
attacks on American soil caused the Bush administration to use its defining powers to initiate 
a host of controversial policies. Leading among these was the policy choice to remove the 
protections provided the prisoners by the Geneva Conventions and the United States 
Constitution, the creation of the “enemy combatants,” and a new and very narrow definition 
of what constituted torture. Congress and the Supreme Court tried to curb the increased 
powers the executive claimed, and the policy choices the administration made with regard to 
the enemy combatants. The attempts made by the two other branches of government gained 
only limited success for the majority of Bush’s two terms, but the Supreme Court was able to 
strike some of Bush’s policies down in two central cases; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and 
Boumediene v. Bush. 
After Barack Obama took office he has reversed almost every policy choice the Bush 
administration made with regard to the enemy combatants, which signals a new course for the 
executive branch and the United States’ government.
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
iv
Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS II
ABSTRACT III
TABLE OF CONTENTS IV
1.0 INTRODUCTION – THE POWER OF DEFINITION 1
1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE THESIS 2
1.2 STRUCTURE AND AIM OF THESIS 3
1.2.1 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 4
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHOD 7
1.3.1 GROUPTHINK 8
1.3.2 ADVISORY SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 9
1.3.3 “THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE” 10
1.4 KEY TERMS 13
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 15
2.0 DISPOSING OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 16
2.1 THE BYBEE MEMO 18
2.2 THE GONZALES MEMO 26
2.3 CONCLUSION 32
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 34
3.0 BANNING TORTURE BY REDEFINITION 36
3.1 ENEMY COMBATANTS 37
3.2 SIGNING STATEMENTS 39
3.3 THE ABU GHRAIB SCANDAL AND TORTURE 40
3.4 SIGNING STATEMENT TO THE DTA 42
3.5 AFTERMATH OF THE ABU GHRAIB SCANDAL AND THE DTA 46
3.6 GROUPTHINK AND THE ADVISORY SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 47
3.7 RESPONDING TO HAMDAN 49
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 50
4.0 INTERPRETATION BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 52
4.1 BATTLE OF THE BRANCHES 53
4.2 EXECUTIVE ORDERS 56
4.3 MOVING TOWARD A MORALLY ACCEPTABLE POLICY? – EXECUTIVE ORDER 13440 57
4.3.1 EXECUTIVE ORDER 13440 – EXECUTIVE DIRECT CONFUSION 58
4.4 THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT 65
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 67
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
v
5.0 CONCLUSION 69
5.1 REDEFINING PRESIDENTIAL POWER – THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 70
5.1.1 A NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY? 74
5.2 REDEFINING PRISONERS OF WAR AND TORTURE 75
5.2.1 REMOVING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND GENEVA III PROTECTIONS 75
5.2.2 DEFINING TORTURE 77
5.3 GROUPTHINK AND THE ADVISORY SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 79
5.4 AFTERMATH:  FROM BUSH TO OBAMA 82
5.5 EPILOGUE – REPORT BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 84
5.5.1 ALI AL-MARRI 85
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 86
APPENDIX 88
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13440 88
BIBLIOGRAPHY 91
BOOKS 91
WEB-BASED SOURCES 92
ARTICLES AND PAPERS 92
EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATION AND SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 95
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
1
1.0 Introduction – The Power of Definition
On January 20 2009, one of the most controversial presidencies of our time ended when 
George W. Bush left the White House. He entered the Oval Office with a very unclear 
mandate, recorded unprecedented numbers, both high and low, in job approval ratings during 
his terms in office, witnessed the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil ever, involved the 
United States in two long and trying wars, alienated former allies, and saw America’s 
reputation in the world plummet before ending his second term in the middle of a financial 
crisis spanning the globe; his presidency can definitely be said to have been an eventful one. 
Bush’s foreign policy strategy received a great deal of criticism both from foreign and 
domestic politicians. The choice to define prisoners taken in the War on Terror as “enemy 
combatants” and to have them tried by military tribunals, as opposed to regular courts martial 
or in the United States federal court system were among the issues most hotly debated during 
his time in office. Another debated issue was the decision to detain prisoners as enemy 
combatants in the prison facilities at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) and secret CIA-prisons 
around the globe. 
The rhetoric throughout the Bush presidency was that the policy choices, regarding the 
detainment, treatment and trial of the prisoners taken in the War on Terror, was needed in 
order to protect the United States from further attacks and in spite of the controversies, the 
administration maintained its position, and stood by its choices without any apparent remorse. 
Vice President Dick Cheney exemplified this in an interview with ABC News as late as mid-
December 2008 when he defended the use of waterboarding as an interrogation method, while 
denying that such a treatment constituted torture.1 Whether or not torture is a matter of 
definition is highly dubious, there are several pieces of legislation, and international treaties, 
foremost among them the Geneva Conventions, outlining what constitutes torture. The 
Geneva Conventions do not spell out an exact definition of torture, so in that respect one 
could argue that torture is in fact a matter of definition, on the other hand some of the cases 
brought up in this thesis will challenge that argument. First however it is important to look at 
the historical background for the War on Terror and some of the controversial policies it 
resulted in.
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1.1 Historical Background for the Thesis
Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress gave George W. Bush the 
power to use any means necessary to find and punish the people he determined to be 
responsible for the attacks. This power was given in the form of a joint resolution by Congress 
on September 18, 2001 called the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).2 Two 
days later Bush held a speech in the House of Representatives which has been called his “War 
on Terrorism Address”.3 The terrorist attacks also led to the first ever invoking of the Atlantic 
Charter’s Article 5 and a subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by a broad coalition of countries 
in October 2001. The reasons for the invasion of Afghanistan were to find the leader of the al 
Qaeda terrorist network, Osama bin Laden, and to quash the terrorist training camps in 
Afghanistan in the process. The coalition quickly toppled the Taliban regime, but their efforts 
to locate and capture bin Laden proved unsuccessful. This caused Bush and his administration 
to shift its focus from Afghanistan and bin Laden to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Amidst outcries 
from the UN and its allies the United States built a “Coalition of Willing,” and launched an 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Prior to the invasion Bush had formulated a new strategy in 
security affairs which has been called “The Bush Doctrine” by scholars. The rationale behind 
this strategy is what is called “preemptive strikes” or “anticipatory self-defense,” meaning that 
it is justifiable to attack, or strike first in order to prevent the enemy from striking.4 This 
strategy was used in Iraq because intelligence showed that Saddam Hussein had ties to al 
Qaeda and that he had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and the argument was that it 
was only a matter of time until Saddam Hussein would use the WMDs.  Both Hussein’s ties to 
al Qaeda, and his alleged possession of WMDs have later been proven to be incorrect, and the 
administration has admitted to some “untruths” in the speech Colin Powell gave to the UN 
prior to the invasion. 
The two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in a host of captured individuals 
suspected of being part of al Qaeda, or being involved in the planning or execution of terrorist 
attacks. In their eagerness to get as much vital information as possible in as short a time as 
possible, paired with the fact that a host of the individuals captured were not captured by 
American or coalition troops, but rather by bounty hunters who turned them over to American 
troops, it has been argued that a lot of innocent people were caught up in the process.5 Many 
of the captured individuals were sent to the prison facilities at Guantanamo Bay, or secret CIA 
prisons around the world, some also ended up in the now infamous Abu Ghraib prison outside 
Baghdad. When the mistreatment and torture that went on in the Abu Ghraib prison became 
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known in 2004, it caused outcries from humanitarian organizations worldwide, as well as 
foreign governments and American politicians. Some of the military personnel involved in the 
treatment of prisoners were tried and convicted by a court-martial in 2005, but these were 
low-ranking and the entire process seemed unsatisfactory to many. In December 2005 
Congress passed legislation regarding the trial and treatment of the prisoners taken in the War 
on Terror, the so-called Detainee Treatment Act (DTA). George W. Bush effectively nullified 
the DTA by attaching a signing statement to the bill, and the Supreme Court eventually 
intervened, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in an attempt to provide clear guidelines to what rights 
the prisoners had and what the executive branch had to with regard to them. This intra-
governmental tug-of-war between the branches continued well into Bush’s final year as 
president with the passing of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) in 2006, and the 
subsequent Supreme Court decision, in Boumediene v. Bush, declaring the MCA 
unconstitutional in June 2008.
1.2 Structure and Aim of Thesis
The aim of this thesis is, as the title suggests, to show that the power to define can have 
dramatic consequences. In doing that this thesis looks at the policy process regarding the 
status, treatment and trial of the prisoners taken in the War on Terror, between the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 and the Supreme Court verdict in Boumediene v. Bush in June 
2008. By analyzing four central documents from the process, this thesis aims to show that the 
Bush administration used its interpretative and defining powers extensively in order to 
achieve its policy goal. Through the administration’s own interpretation of legislation – both 
domestic and international – it was able to redefine, not only, the status of the prisoners taken 
in the War on Terror as enemy combatants, but how these enemy combatants were treated in 
captivity and during interrogations, and how they would be tried. The four documents are 
analyzed in the context of other pieces of legislation that were central in the policy process. In 
chapter 2 two memos determining that the prisoners taken in the War on Terror would not be 
afforded the protections of the Geneva Conventions are analyzed. Chapter 3 analyzes a 
signing statement attached to the Detainee Treatment Act, which nullifies the act, as well as 
the debate that occurred between the different branches of government in response to the Abu 
Ghraib scandal. The outcome of the debate was the Military Commissions Act and a 
subsequent executive order. The executive order, which continued the interpretations of the 
Geneva Conventions begun in the memos from Chapter 2, is analyzed in Chapter 4 of this 
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thesis. The documents were chosen because they represent turning points, or attempted 
turning points, in the policy regarding the status, treatment, and trial of the enemy combatants.
By using his defining powers Bush was also able to expand presidential prerogatives 
and powers by redefining them in line with what has been known as “the unitary executive 
theory.” This theory, as presented in a paper by Christopher S. Kelley to the 63rd Annual 
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in April 2005,6 proved vital in 
understanding the rationale behind the administration’s choice to act when faced with 
attempts, by Congress or the judiciary, to rein in their policies regarding the enemy 
combatants. The thesis also tests two additional theories on decision-making in foreign policy. 
The first theory is Irving L. Janis’ theories on groupthink, which tests whether a policy 
making group can fall victim to group mentality causing it to seek concurrence between 
members at the cost of policy debate.7 The second is David Mitchell’s theory on how
presidents manage the decision-making process and what types of solutions their
management-style produces in what Mitchell calls the Advisory Systems Framework8 (ASF). 
All three theories are explained more thoroughly in Chapter 1.3.
1.2.1 Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 analyzes some of the internal communication sent between the White House, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Defense (DOD) in late January, 2001. 
The two memos have been chosen because they discuss and affirm why al Qaeda warriors and 
members of the Taliban regime who had been taken or would be taken later in Afghanistan 
were not protected by the Geneva Conventions or United States federal law. The most 
important document analyzed is a memo from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to the 
White House and the DOD, which also opines that the President has a unilateral power to 
interpret and suspend the Geneva Conventions. In addition a memo from then White House 
Counsel Alberto Gonzales to George W. Bush reconsidering the findings from Bybee’s memo 
at the request of Secretary of State Colin Powell is analyzed. The analysis of these documents 
provides an insight into the decision-making process regarding the treatment the United States 
would afford the prisoners, and also the rationale behind the administration’s choice of 
policies. The findings are also applied to the two theories on policy-making processes in 
foreign policy; Janis’ theory on groupthink and Mitchell’s theory on the Advisory Systems 
Framework. The findings indicate that a degree of groupthink occurred between the central 
players in the administration, most notably President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald 
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Rumsfeld, and the authors of the memos, Jay Bybee and Alberto Gonzales. There are a few 
symptoms of groupthink present, but if one applies the strict set of antecedent conditions and 
key questions Janis provides, the findings do not provide enough evidence of groupthink to 
conclude that it occurred. The debate and policy decision based on the two memos does 
provide enough evidence to conclude that Mitchell’s assignment of Bush within the advisory 
systems framework is satisfactory. The analysis of the two documents found enough evidence 
for Kelley’s assertion that the Bush administration embraced the unitary executive theory, 
which proved to be central in understanding how the administration operated.
Chapter 3 begins with how the administration created a new definition for the prisoners taken 
in the War on Terror. The term, “enemy combatants,” is discussed in terms of its legal 
precedent and argument by critics, among them Howard Ball, who argues that the term is 
“legally meaningless.”9 The creation of the enemy combatants shows that Bush continued to 
use his defining powers in order to achieve his intended policy goal with severe consequences 
for many of the prisoners. There is also a brief summary of what a signing statement is, and 
how it traditionally has been used. The chapter then jumps a few years ahead to the debate 
caused by the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004. The scandal became an international media event 
immediately and a few American politicians, most prominently John McCain, a former 
prisoner of war in Vietnam himself, vowed to take action in order to stop the maltreatment of 
prisoners in U.S. custody. He did this by sponsoring a torture ban which was included in an 
emergency appropriations bill in December 2005. The White House initially tried to block the 
inclusion of the torture ban, but Bush eventually relented and Congress succeeded in limiting 
the administrations actions by passing what is now known as the Detainee Treatment Act 
(DTA) in December 2005. Congress’ victory was short-lived, however, as Bush was able to 
nullify the entire DTA in three sentences in his signing statement to the bill. Bush’s signing 
statement to the DTA is analyzed in this chapter, and it was chosen because it is a direct 
response by the administration to what Bush viewed as Congressional interference with the 
policies regarding the enemy combatants. The DTA and the signing statement to it also serve 
as the beginning of a prolonged tug-of-war between the branches, as the Supreme Court 
addressed Bush’s signing statement in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the conclusion of which caused 
Bush to turn to Congress in order to continue with the intended regime for trying the enemy 
combatants. As the document analyzed in the chapter is a presidential signing statement, an 
example of direct executive action, it is less likely to have included several people in the 
process of formulating it. This makes it less likely to find further proof of groupthink, but 
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when the context of the signing statement, and its subsequent results some new arguments are 
made. Chapter 3 also shows that Mitchell’s Advisory Systems Framework and his theory on 
how presidents manage the decision-making process does not provide insight in to the policy 
process directly, but functions as an explanation for how some of the symptoms of groupthink 
occurred. A presidential signing statement is one of the key characteristics of the unitary 
executive according to Kelley, and his theory proves to be suitable in understanding the 
administrations actions.
Chapter 4 begins with a brief summary of what an executive order is and how, why and when 
it is traditionally used. The controversies surrounding the passing of the Military 
Commissions Act – less than two weeks before the 2006 Midterm Elections – are included to 
provide additional context for the policy choices the administration made. The MCA was the 
administration’s response to the Supreme Court’s verdict in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, discussed 
in Chapter 3, and the Act included several controversial provisions which will be discussed.
Foremost among them may be what seems like an institutionalization of the principles of the 
unitary executive, which proves that the administration’s power to define presidential powers 
had grown immensely. Another provision of the MCA stated that the president should issue 
an executive order in line with the Act, the executive order is analyzed in this chapter. The 
executive order was signed by George W. Bush in July 2007, and is called: “Executive Order 
13440 - Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program 
of Detention and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.” The executive 
order is closely connected with the previous chapters because it outlines the administration’s 
views on what does and does not constitute compliance with the Geneva Conventions. The 
analysis shows that the unitary executive interpretations were still present in the 
administration in spite of the controversies Bush’s policies caused with regard to the enemy 
combatants, and that the power to define still could have significant consequences for the 
balance of power, and the fate of the enemy combatants. In the preamble to the executive 
order president Bush refers to the power vested in him by both the AUMF and the MCA in 
addition to the Constitution and the Delegating Functions in the United States Code. This 
executive order then relies on powers given to the president by the Constitution, and powers 
given him after the terrorist attacks, and even on legislation less than a year old at the time of 
issuance. The language of the executive order seems contradictory in places, and after the 
analysis one is left with the assumption that the order does in fact not supply anything new or 
any changes to the existing policies at that point. 
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The chapter ends with the Supreme Court verdict from the June 2008 decision in 
Boumediene v. Bush, and how President Bush’s defining powers seemed to have come to an 
end. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework and Method
The stated aim of this thesis is to look at the processes going on within the executive branch 
during George W. Bush’s presidency, and whether or not Bush’s management style affected 
the policies enacted by the administration, and to show that the policy choices and 
redefinitions and reinterpretations of legislation, presidential power, prisoner status and 
torture had dramatic consequences for the enemy combatants, and for the balance of power 
within the U.S. Government. The methodological approach to this thesis is to do a close 
reading, or analysis, of four documents, and testing three theories on the presidency against 
the findings provided by the analysis. By testing the theories the thesis attempts to find further 
explanations for the policy choices the administration made which are not provided by the 
analysis.
The thesis includes several web-based sources, and it is important to consider the 
reliability of this type of source. All the analyzed documents, and the Supreme Court 
opinions, are retrieved from the internet. The author has determined that the sources the 
documents are retrieved from are reliable because the legislation and Supreme Court opinions 
are retrieved from a well known source, FindLaw which publishes all legislation and Supreme 
Court cases, while the executive order and signing statement are retrieved from a database of 
presidential documents created by the University of California at Santa Barbara called The 
Presidency Project – which also came as a recommended source by Petter Næss at the United 
States Embassy in Oslo. A lot of the historical context provided is from articles published in 
the online edition of several major news outlets like CNN, The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, and FOX News. For these sources it is important to remember that the news 
outlets are not objective observers, but may have a political agenda. The way they are used in 
thesis does not make any political agenda the news outlet may have a problem, however. 
The sources included in this thesis which are not web-based are mostly theoretical 
books, but Howard Ball’s Bush, the Detainees and the Constitution is a scathing criticism of 
the Bush administration’s policies regarding the detainees between 2001 and 2006. The book 
also provides the original texts of the MCA, but as long as the author is aware of Ball’s 
opinion of the policies it should not pose a problem.
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1.3.1 Groupthink
Irving L. Janis, a psychologist at Yale University, sought to find explanations for foreign-
policy fiascoes by looking at group dynamics in policy-making groups. He elaborated on his 
ideas in the 1982 book Groupthink where he investigated the possibility that group mentality 
could help in explaining policy fiascoes by applying them to a number of cases, among them 
the Bay of Pigs invasion, the escalation of the Vietnam War and the Watergate cover-up.10
His central argument is that policy-making groups are just as affected and influenced by 
pressures to conform to the group as ordinary citizens.11 The ambition of this thesis is to test 
the internal communication within the administration to find if the process was in any way 
affected by groupthink. Because Janis mainly used his theory to test policy failures, the
question of whether or not the policy outcome of withholding Geneva Convention protections 
from alleged members of al Qaeda and the Taliban can be said to be a failure is pertinent. In 
light of the amount of controversy, and attempts by Congress and especially the Supreme 
Court to limit the administration, that came as a result of this initial debate, and final policy 
outcome, it seems probable that it would be wrong to label it as a success, though the Bush 
administration is likely to disagree with that argument. This point is further strengthened by 
the fact that one of Barack Obama’s first actions as president was to sign two executive orders 
which completely reversed the policies Bush had enacted with regard to the enemy 
combatants. It is important to remember that even though a specific policy outcome can be 
labeled as a failure, or fiasco, there may not be sufficient evidence to label the outcome as a 
victim of groupthink, as Janis is quick to point out. He also points out that even though a 
policy outcome can be said to be a result of groupthink, it may not necessarily be a failure.12
To determine whether something has been affected by groupthink, Janis lists eight 
“symptoms of groupthink,” divided into three different types. The two first symptoms are, 
Type I symptoms, or what he calls “overestimation of the group,” that the group shares an 
illusion that they are invulnerable thus making risks more likely, and that the group has an 
inherent morality causing it to ignore ethical problems with the chosen action.13 The Type II 
symptoms are symptoms of “closed mindedness,” the first of these being that there is a 
collective rationalization within the group preventing them from exploring alternatives to the 
course decided upon despite warnings or expert opinions. The second Type II symptom is a 
stereotyped view of the enemy leaders and the enemy as too evil, stupid or weak to warrant 
negotiations.14 The final four symptoms Janis’ describes are the Type III symptoms. All these 
symptoms are what he calls “pressures toward uniformity,” and causes the group’s members 
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to self-censor any deviations from the agreed upon course, believe in an illusion of unanimity, 
pressure members with contradicting or alternative views to conform, and finally that what he 
calls “mindguards” emerges to “protect the group from adverse information.”15
In order to conclude that groupthink occurred, a majority of these symptoms need to 
be present, but even though all eight symptoms are present, there is still need for additional 
prerequisites, or antecedent conditions, to help facilitate the occurrence of groupthink.16 Janis 
lists four such antecedents: (1) insulation of the group making it impossible to confer with 
experts, (2) the leader of the group (the president) being too strong and exerting too much 
influence on the other members of the group, (3) a lack of procedures and norms for dealing 
with the decision-making process, and (4) psychological stress or pressure.17 If the symptoms 
and at least one of the antecedent conditions are present, and four additional key questions can 
be answered,  Janis finds that the likelihood for groupthink being present to be big, and in his 
conclusion he states that “the groupthink syndrome sometimes plays a major role in producing 
large-scale fiascoes.”18 Janis’ theory is tested against the individual documents, and their 
contexts, analyzed in each chapter of this thesis, and then on the entire process as a whole, to 
find if groupthink, or a degree of groupthink, influenced the policy making process.
1.3.2 Advisory Systems Framework
In Making Foreign Policy, David Mitchell focuses more on how presidents manage the 
decision-making process than how the policies are discussed within the group. The advisory 
systems framework he outlines consists of four different management styles producing several 
different solutions. The management styles are put into two categories; they are either formal 
or collegial, and they consist of either high or low centralization.19
In a formal structure the president sits at the top of a strictly hierarchical system 
surrounded by highly specialized advisors and gets presented with filtered information 
through a “gatekeeper,” who functions as an honestbroker, presenting the different options 
available to the president. For George W. Bush’s first term this gatekeeper was National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, while his main advisors on foreign policy were Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Vice-President Dick 
Cheney. He also included several others who traditionally were not a part of the advisors 
around the president according to Mitchell. These were primarily the Assistant to the Vice-
President on National Security Scooter Libby, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, 
and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.20 These advisors discusses among 
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themselves without the President taking part before the information is supplied to the 
President and he makes a decision based on the available options. 
In a collegial system the president sits at the centre of a group of advisors and takes 
part in the discussion. The discussions are often generalized and the hierarchy is not as clear.21
Pointing out that Bush stated that he would run the White House like a business; Mitchell 
expects the decision-making process to conform to a formal management style.22 Mitchell 
continues by analyzing the first term of George W. Bush as two periods; before and after 
September 11 2001, and concludes that Bush’s management style moved from a formal 
system with low centralization to one with high centralization, mainly because he became 
more involved and interested in foreign policy as time went by.23
The main difference between systems with high centralization as opposed to low 
centralization is the number of options and amount of information supplied to the president 
through the gatekeeper. In a formal system with high centralization the gatekeeper only 
presents the ‘best’ option to the president while excluding differing views, this option is often 
geared towards the president’s preferences by the gatekeeper and produces what Mitchell 
calls a “dominant solution.” In a formal system with low centralization the gatekeeper 
presents all available, and equally good, options to the president who then either makes a 
decision based on his world-views and values – what Mitchell calls a “dominant-subset” – or 
the situation ends in a “deadlock” between options that cannot be reconciled. In a system with 
low centralization, the president’s advisors also have an option to circumvent procedure and 
appeal directly to the president in order to secure ones own option as the best one.24
For the purpose of this thesis Mitchell’s theory proves to serve more as an addendum 
to Janis’ theory on groupthink more than anything else.
1.3.3 “The Unitary Executive”
The unitary executive is a theory on presidential power which began developing under Ronald 
Reagan as a result of the perceived assault on the Presidency after Richard Nixon and 
Watergate.25 Christopher S. Kelley says that George W. Bush was the first president to 
reference the unitary executive directly, and that he used the term 95 times in signing 
statements, executive orders or in response to Congressional resolutions in his first four years 
as president.26 Even though Bush is the first president to reference the term, Kelley argues that 
he merely formalized a process which begun during Ronald Reagan’s presidency in the early 
1980s. 
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The main tenet of “the unitary executive”-theory is that it rests upon what Kelley calls 
“coordinate construction,” meaning that the President, and his administration, believes that all 
three branches of government have the power and duty to interpret the Constitution,27 and that 
this power rests on the Take Care Clause and the Oath Clause under Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution.28 The principle of “coordinate construction” is shown to be a form of “executive 
judicial review,” in this thesis. The unitary executive also rests upon what Kelley calls 
departmentalism, meaning that the president is the only person vested with executive power, 
and that he therefore must have complete control over the executive branch in terms of 
delegating powers and functions, and hiring, replacing and removing subordinate officers.29
This thesis shows that Bush followed these principles to a large degree, and that he used 
coordinate construction extensively in his pursuit of his policy goals.
Some scholars, Kelley mentions Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo, date the 
unitary executive back to the administration of George Washington, but Kelley disagrees and 
argues that the unitary executive was “championed by (…) the Federalist Society, a group of 
conservative lawyers who (…) worked in the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan White Houses.”30 The 
fact that the unitary executive stems from a group of conservative lawyers is interesting in 
terms of the number of “neo-cons” in the Bush administration, making it more likely that the 
use of unitary executive principles were influenced by the more conservative forces in Bush’s 
administration. If the unitary executive is a conservative ideology, it is to be expected that 
George W. Bush would embrace the theory and its principles. 
In addition to coordinate construction, the unitary executive operates under the 
impression that the environment is hostile, causing the unitary executive to aggressively push 
constitutional boundaries in order to protect what is perceived as the prerogatives of the 
executive office, Kelley calls this aggressive pushing of boundaries “venture 
constitutionalism.”31 There are several other aspects of the unitary executive, among them 
control over the regulatory process, and an increased role for the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), but these aspects of the unitary executive are not relevant in the context of 
this thesis.
The Bush administration’s adherence to the unitary executive theory is most clearly 
evinced in a speech by Alberto Gonzales, then-White House Counsel, and author of the 
Gonzales Memo analyzed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, to the American Bar Association in 
2002: 
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The Framer in the Federalist Papers spoke explicitly about the need for a 
unitary executive presidency precisely to allow for bigger effectiveness and 
accountability in the conduct of our foreign and military affairs.32
As this thesis shows, the statement made by Gonzales is exactly what the Bush administration 
argued in terms of fighting the War on Terror, and its policies regarding the enemy 
combatants.
The two main features of the unitary executive in practice is the extensive use of 
signing statements to protect presidential prerogatives33, and controlling the executive branch 
by controlling information, or the regulatory process to avoid infringements.34 There is no 
doubt that George W. Bush embraced the use of the signing statement as Kelley provides 
statistics for the number of times signing statements have been used since the presidency of 
James Monroe. In the period from Monroe to Jimmy Carter, the signing statement was used a 
total of 109 times to protect presidential prerogatives or direct executive agencies. For the 
presidencies of Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton the number of uses 
skyrocketed to 396, while in George W. Bush’s first term alone he made 435 signing 
statements, the majority of which were protest to what Bush perceived as infringements on the 
prerogatives of the unitary executive office.35
There seems to be little doubt about Kelley’s argument that George W. Bush used his 
first term to consolidate the principles of the unitary executive, and Kelley argues that Bush 
governed unilaterally on many occasions during his first term.36 This thesis includes events, 
examples, and documents from Bush’s second term as well as from his first term, and the 
findings in this thesis support Kelley’s arguments. 
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1.4 Key Terms
The Geneva Conventions are discussed a great deal in this thesis and the Third Geneva 
Convention specifically. It is important to note that the Third Geneva Convention, or Geneva 
III, refers to what is officially called the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War. The other three Geneva Conventions are not included to any large degree in the thesis, 
and as such, any reference to the Geneva Convention – without the plural ‘s’ – is a reference 
to Geneva III. Any reference to the Geneva Conventions – with the plural ‘s’ – refers to all 
four Conventions as a whole. As Geneva III includes 143 articles as well as additional 
appendixes – or annexes – any reference to “common article 3” or “Article 2” for instance is a 
reference to the article under Geneva III unless stated otherwise.
In the memo sent by Alberto R. Gonzales to George W. Bush on January 25, 2002, 
which is analyzed in Chapter 2, Gonzales refers to “Geneva Convention III on the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War (GPW),” this is a reference to Geneva III as well, meaning that any 
reference Gonzales makes to GPW is a reference to Geneva III.
High Contracting Party refers to the signatory nations of the Geneva Conventions, or the 
nations which have ratified, but not signed it.
The Bybee Memo in this thesis refers to a memo sent from the OLC by Assistant Attorney 
General Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales and William J. Haynes II on January 25, 2001. 
This is not identical to the more famous “Bybee Memo” titled “Re: Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18. U.S.C. §§ 2340 – 2340A” of August 1, 2002. Any reference to this 
second memo will be titled “the Bybee Torture Memo” or “the Torture Memo.” 
Enemy Combatants is a term coined by the Bush administration to define the prisoners taken 
in the War on Terror. An enemy combatant is not a prisoner of war, nor a lawful- or unlawful 
combatant as referred to by the Geneva Conventions. The term was coined to create a new 
standard for the detained persons, and the term is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis.
Waterboarding is an interrogation method used by the U.S. Military during interrogations of 
prisoners in the War on Terror. Waterboarding is a form of simulated drowning where the 
suspect is strapped to a board with the head lowered and a cloth covering the face – or mouth 
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and nose – then water is poured onto the cloth to cause suffocation.37 The administration 
argued that this did not constitute torture as the interview with Dick Cheney exemplified, but 
the argument has received harsh criticism from several sources; among them the Human 
Rights Watch.38
A Presidential Signing Statement – or simply a signing statement – is a statement attached 
to the President’s signature when he signs a bill into law. The signing statement has been used 
as a tool to interpret legislation, and direct the executive branch in how to implement the 
legislation, by presidents since Ronald Reagan according to scholar Philip J. Cooper.39
Signing statements may have other more ceremonial uses as well and are discussed more in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis.
Executive Orders are orders issued unilaterally by the President of the United States for 
several different reasons. An executive order has the same status as law, but only as long as it 
is not revoked. An executive order can be revoked by the sitting president by issuing a new 
executive order revoking the old one. We see an example of this in the conclusion of this 
thesis. Executive orders can also be overturned by the Supreme Court, or by Congress passing
legislation overriding the executive order. Chapter 4 discusses some of the reasons why 
executive orders are issued, and different uses for them.
Military Commissions, in the context of this thesis, are the Bush administrations intended 
way of putting the prisoners to trial. The military commissions would operate outside the 
normal rules and procedures of a federal trial, or a court martial, leaving the prisoners with 
significantly less protection than they would normally have been given. The Military 
Commissions Act, passed in 2006, also allowed the use of secret evidence, or evidence 
obtained through coercion to be brought before the military commission.
Habeas Corpus, or the writ of habeas corpus, is an old and central part of English common 
law, which allows a person imprisoned by a government to challenge his imprisonment by 
submitting a request to a judge. The judge may then issue a writ of habeas corpus allowing the 
prisoner to meet before a court which will determine if the imprisonment was lawful or not.40
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2.0 Disposing of the Geneva Conventions
Two months after the invasion of Afghanistan by Coalition forces and the Afghani Northern 
Alliance militia in October 2001, the Taliban government was toppled. The initial military 
success caused an influx of prisoners held by the United States military, and a subsequent 
need to decide how to deal with the new prisoners. Among the prisoners were members of 
both al Qaeda and the Taliban and in the beginning of 2002 the Bush administration reached a 
policy decision regarding the manner these prisoners should be treated and tried. The policy 
debate also included discussions of the extent the administration had to be concerned about 
international and domestic legislation, mainly the Geneva Conventions and the War Crimes 
Act. President Bush had signed a military order on November 13, 2001, determining that any 
prisoner found to have ties to al Qaeda would be tried by military commission and subject to a 
potential sentence of life in prison, or death.1 In the military order Bush also ordered that the 
prisoners should be treated as humanely as possible with no adverse treatment based on the 
prisoners’ religion, gender, race, wealth and similar criteria being inflicted upon the prisoner.2
As for the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and domestic law for these prisoners the 
policy was outlined and decided upon in January 2002.
One of the earliest available documents from within the administration regarding the 
prisoners taken in Afghanistan is Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld’s message to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCoS), which is dated January 19, 2002.3 Rumsfeld’s message is not 
analyzed here, but it gives an indication of the policy the administration had chosen: 
The United States has determined that Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the 
control of the Department of Defense are not entitled to prisoner of war status for 
purposes of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.4
The policy decision was based on a legal opinion issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
on January 18, 2001.5 This chapter analyzes two memos from the debate that occurred within 
the administration with respect to the Geneva Conventions’ – especially the Third Geneva 
Convention, or Geneva III’s – applicability to the prisoners taken in Afghanistan. The analysis 
provides an explanation for how and why the administration was able to decide that al Qaeda 
and Taliban prisoners would not be afforded the protections given by Geneva III. The analysis 
indicates that the policy choice to not apply the Geneva Conventions to the detainment of al 
Qaeda and Taliban prisoners was to some extent influenced by elements of “groupthink.” 
Irving L. Janis presented his theory, which supposes that policy making groups are influenced 
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by group mentality and a pressure to conform, in Groupthink in 1982.6 The analysis also 
indicates that David Mitchell’s argument that George W. Bush’s place in Mitchell’s 
“Advisory Systems Framework” (ASF) is correct. Mitchell places presidential management of 
the decision making process into a framework of either high or low centralization, with either 
a collegial or a formal management style – and argues that Bush moved from a formal system 
with low centralization to a formal system with high centralization during his first term.7
The first analysis is of a memo (the Bybee Memo) sent by Assistant Attorney General 
Jay S. Bybee from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to the General Counsel to the 
President, Alberto R. Gonzales and to the General Counsel to the Department of Defense, 
William J. Haynes II.8 This memo, sent on January 22, 2002, outlines the opinion held by the 
DOJ with regard to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and United States federal law 
on prisoners taken in the War on Terror. The Bybee Memo contains several examples of the 
principles Christopher S. Kelley outlines in his paper on “the unitary executive,”9 and 
indicates that the Bush administration embraced the unitary executive at an early stage, in line 
with Kelley’s argument. Most evident in the Bybee Memo is the unitary executive principle of 
“coordinate construction” – the belief that all branches of government have the right and duty 
to interpret legislation in a way similar to judicial review – which Kelley says is one of the 
main pillars of the unitary executive theory.10 The analysis shows that the opinion held by the 
DOJ and echoed by Rumsfeld in the message to the JCoS, quoted above, was reached through 
a series of loopholes and interpretations of the text of the Geneva Conventions and the U.S. 
Constitution.
After the DOJ’s opinion was issued and Bush had decided upon a policy in line with 
what the Bybee Memo outlined, Secretary of State Colin Powell asked President Bush to 
reconsider the policy decision and decide that the Geneva Conventions’ prisoner of war status 
would be applied to al Qaeda and the Taliban, and that the protections it provides would only 
be removed after a case-by-case review of the prisoners.11
The second memo (the Gonzales Memo) analyzed in this chapter was sent by Alberto 
Gonzales, on January 25, 2002, to George W. Bush reconsidering the findings of the Bybee 
Memo as Powell requested. The memo reconsiders the findings from the Bybee, but 
concludes that the opinion issued by the Bybee Memo is satisfactory, and that the Military 
Order issued by President Bush in November 2001 will ensure that both al Qaeda and Taliban 
prisoners will be treated in line with the Geneva Conventions even if Geneva III, and the 
protections it provides, will not be applied to the prisoners.12 By analyzing the two memos, 
the rationale and legal arguments for Bush’s policy choices are made clear and it is possible to 
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obtain a picture of what would be the policies in the years to come, regarding the status, 
treatment, trial, and applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the prisoners taken in the War 
on Terror. The analysis is limited to two memos for several reasons; first of all a more 
extensive analysis of additional memos would in all likelihood reproduce the facts found in 
the Gonzales and Bybee Memos, secondly this debate took place between the White House, 
the DOJ and the DOD. The lone dissenter in the debate seems to be the State Department, 
represented by Colin Powell, who did not really protest in any significant way, but only asked
for a reconsideration of the opinion presented in the Bybee Memo. 
2.1 The Bybee Memo
The Bybee Memo discusses the applicability of the Third Geneva Conventions on al Qaeda 
and Taliban members captured in Afghanistan, and whether any deviations from the text of 
Geneva III may be in violation of either the Geneva III or the War Crimes Act – “the WCA” –
(18 U.S.C. §2441), which Bybee finds to be the most relevant federal law as it incorporates 
“several provisions of international treaties governing the laws of war.”13 The conclusion is 
found in the very first paragraph of the memo in which Bybee states: “We conclude that these 
treaties do not protect members of the al Qaeda [and that the] President has sufficient grounds 
to find that these treaties do not protect members of the Taliban militia,”14 Bybee also 
emphasizes that the memo is not intended to direct policy, but only serve as the DOJ’s legal 
opinion on the matter.
Part I of the Bybee Memo outlines the background and gives an overview of the WCA and the 
Geneva Conventions as a whole. At the time of writing the detention facilities at Guantanamo 
Bay (GTMO) was still under construction, but Bybee understands that the temporary 
facilities, though some may argue that they violate Geneva III provisions, “meet minimal 
humanitarian requirements.”15 It is understandable that it may be difficult to provide 
satisfactory facilities immediately after an unexpected terrorist attack and subsequent invasion 
of a territory half a world away, but the fact that the OLC seems satisfied with aiming for 
“minimal requirements” from the beginning may prove indicative of the years to come. The 
following paragraphs outlines what the WCA was intended to do when it was passed, and 
Bybee concludes that the most important consideration to be taken with regard to the WCA is 
that it criminalizes “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions. He continues by quoting 
what Geneva III defines as a “grave breach”, and finally concludes that “Only by causing 
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great suffering or serious bodily injury to POWs, killing or torturing them, depriving them of 
access to a fair trial, or forcing them to serve in the [U.S.] Armed Forces, could the United 
States actually commit a grave breach.”16 Any other form of deviation from or “non-grave 
breach” of the text of Geneva III can not be criminalized under the WCA. The WCA also 
criminalizes violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as a war crime, but 
Bybee concludes that the requirements of article 3 are “much less onerous and less detailed 
than those spelled out in the Conventions as a whole.”17 Again the reader is struck by what 
seems to be an attempt to find the easiest possible and “least onerous” way out of the situation 
the prisoners ‘has put the United States in,’ and not an attempt to find a responsible and legal 
way to handle the prisoners. In a few short paragraphs Bybee has outlined that short of 
harming, torturing, killing or forcing prisoners to serve in the Army, the WCA can be 
disregarded. He then moves on to what common article 3 of Geneva III says, and for what 
type of conflict it is valid. He begins by stating that common article 3 is a complement to 
common article 2, which applies to declared war, or other types of armed conflict, between 
two or more high contracting parties.18 Because common article 3 refers to conflicts “not of 
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,”19
Bybee concludes that it refers to cases of civil war, meaning that common article 3 is not valid 
or applicable at all for the prisoners taken in Afghanistan. This view is supported by both 
“Geneva contemporary” legal scholars and what Bybee refers to as “commentators”. However 
another viewpoint on common article 3 is brought up by Bybee when he refers to a decision 
from the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in the case Prosecutor v 
Tadic where the tribunal found that common article 3 is a “catch-all” that refers to any 
conflict not covered by common article 2.20  Bybee strongly rejects this interpretation of 
common article 3 for several reasons, primarily because if the parties to the Geneva 
Conventions had intended common article 3 to be a catch-all provision, Bybee argues that 
they would have used clearer language. He argues that such an interpretation ignores both the 
text and context the United States ratified the Conventions in, and since a conflict like the one 
in Afghanistan was unforeseen at the time of drafting, it was not taken into account by the 
drafters and therefore the conflict cannot be covered by common article 3. This also means 
that the conflict in Afghanistan is not covered by the WCA since, according to Bybee, 
common article 3 and the relevant provisions of the WCA mentioning common article 3 only 
refers to cases of civil war.21 Bybee’s opinion is a good example of coordinate construction, 
that the executive interprets legislation to make it preferable to the executive’s goals. By 
reading both the WCA and Geneva III the way he does, Bybee removes any potential legal 
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obstacles that would occur if the President were to make a policy choice in line with the 
memo.
In Part II of the memo Bybee discusses the application of Geneva III and the WCA to 
members of al Qaeda. Resting on the findings from Part I, Bybee finds that al Qaeda and its 
associated members are not protected by the WCA or Geneva III, nor are the legislation 
applicable to al Qaeda for three reasons. 
First he notes that since al Qaeda is neither a state, nor a High Contracting Party, al 
Qaeda members are not eligible for protections under common article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions, regarding armed conflict between High Contracting Parties. However Bybee 
brings up common article 4 which states that prisoner-of-war (POW) status must be afforded 
to: “[m]embers of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of 
organized resistance movements” and “[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess 
allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.”22 There is 
a possibility that al Qaeda would fall into a one or both of these categories as they can 
arguably be said to be a militia or a volunteer corps, but Bybee rejects that common article 4 
provides al Qaeda members with POW status because he reads common article 4 as having no 
jurisdiction in its own and that it only serves as an addendum to common article 2 regarding 
war between High Contracting Parties. Because Bybee has already determined that the 
conflict in Afghanistan is not covered by common article 2, this means that common article 4 
has no bearing on the DOJ’s opinion. 
Secondly common article 4 sets out a few requirements for militias or volunteer corps 
to be qualified for POW status, the most important being that they have a “fixed distinctive 
sign recognizable at a distance” and that they “[follow] the laws and customs of war.”23 It 
would be safe to assume that al Qaeda does not carry a fixed and distinctive sign making them 
recognizable as al Qaeda members, and Bybee argues that they most certainly did not follow 
the laws of war as they “hijacked civilian airliners, took hostages, and killed them.”24 A 
counterargument to Bybee’s opinion may be that the terrorists who actually hijacked the 
planes on September 11, 2001 are dead and the al Qaeda members who were taken in the
subsequent invasion of Afghanistan may not be to blame for the actions of a now deceased 
few of their network. This is not a point Bybee discusses, but Bybee is probably right that it is 
unlikely that the al Qaeda members taken in Afghanistan operated under the customs and laws 
of war. 
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Bybee’s third and final point for why al Qaeda members do not qualify for application 
of Geneva III and the WCA is relying heavily on the findings in Part I on the memo. Since 
common article 3 only refers to cases of a “non-international character” – what Bybee 
concluded to be instances of civil war – and since the operations against al Qaeda and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan is not a civil war, and because the conflict is of an international 
character, this effectively precludes any application of common article 3 and in turn the 
WCA. In Bybee’s own words “the military’s treatment of al Qaeda members is not limited 
either by common article 3 or [the WCA].”25 This final opinion is based exclusively on 
Bybee’s own reading of Geneva III, and again leaves the impression that the goal for the 
United States is to provide as little as possible to their prisoners because it makes it easier. It 
also serves as additional proof of the executive interpreting legislation to suits its needs.
In Part III of the memo Bybee discusses the application of the Geneva Conventions to the 
Taliban militia. He begins by saying that whether Geneva III applies to the trial and detention 
of the Taliban or not “presents a more difficult legal question,” than Geneva III application to 
al Qaeda does.26 The main arguments for “non-application” of Geneva III is that even though 
Afghanistan is party to all four Geneva Conventions, and has been since 1956 – something 
that would imply Geneva III protections and also trigger the WCA – Afghanistan can 
arguably be defined as a failed-, or rogue state, and that the Taliban either relied too heavily 
on al Qaeda to be an effective government, or that al Qaeda controlled the Taliban thus 
disabling any governmental functions the Taliban had. He also questions whether the Taliban 
can be said to have been a government at all and not just another terrorist organization.27
Bybee finds that the President is in his full right to suspend any treaty obligations toward 
Afghanistan because: “Under Article II of the Constitution, the President has the unilateral
power to suspend whole treaties or parts of them at his discretion” (emphasis added).28 He 
defends this position by quoting Thomas Jefferson stating that Congress has normally 
deferred foreign affairs to the executive, and that conducting foreign affairs is an exclusively 
executive power, barring a few “negative[s] by the senate [sic].”29 However one of the few 
negatives granted the Senate by the Constitution is the conduction of treaties with other 
nations, making the “unilateral power” under Article II of the Constitution highly debatable. 
Bybee’s interpretation of the Constitution is again in line with Kelley’s description of 
coordinate construction under the unitary executive theory, as Bybee interprets Article II of 
the U.S. Constitution to include presidential powers that are not mentioned. If Bybee’s 
interpretation is correct, there would be no need for the Senate to be included in the 
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conduction of treaties since the President could ignore any treaty ratified by the Senate. The 
interpretation would still leave the Senate with the power to block treaties, but would also 
give a newly elected president the power to pick and choose which treaties he would adhere to 
and which he would ignore, a power that is unlikely to have been intended by the founding 
fathers, and making long-term planning in foreign relations an impossibility.
In the latter paragraphs of Part III, Bybee considers a suspension of Geneva III 
obligations toward Afghanistan in light of international legislation. He brings up the Vienna 
Convention as an example of customary international law (CIL), and that both lower U.S. 
federal courts, and the State Department have shared the view that a breach of “treaties of a 
humanitarian character” is a breach of CIL. However Bybee’s argument is that the United 
States is not party to the Vienna Convention, and even if customary international laws are 
broken, domestic laws are not.30 Additionally the Geneva Conventions common article 1 
binds the “High Contracting Parties to respect and try to ensure respect for [the Geneva 
Convention] in all circumstances”31, meaning that regardless of the actions of the opposing 
party to an ongoing conflict, the Geneva Conventions must be honored at all times. Bybee 
finds that this reading of common article 1, and the Vienna Conventions “cannot be correct”, 
because “[t]here is no textual provision in the Geneva Conventions that clearly prohibits 
temporary suspension [of them].” He continues: “if the drafters [of Geneva III] believed the 
treaties could not be suspended, while allowing for withdrawal and denunciation, they could 
have said so explicitly and easily in the text.”32 This interpretation brings up a very interesting 
paradox in Bybee’s reasoning, as he apparently needs textual proof from the Geneva 
Convention in order for an interpretation of it to be correct, while at the same time he believes 
that the President has the implied, unilateral power to suspend any treaty under the U.S. 
Constitution without any textual proof from the Constitution of that implied power. In other 
words Bybee demands textual proof to accept limits on U.S. and presidential power from 
international legislation while he seems to have no need of the same from the U.S. 
Constitution when it comes to expanding U.S. and presidential power. 
In the conclusion of Part III of the memo Bybee discusses the application of Geneva 
Conventions as a matter of policy. He writes that “[T]he President may determine that (…) in 
order to encourage other States to comply with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. [I]t 
serves the interest of the United States to treat al Qaeda or Taliban detainees as if they were 
prisoners of war, even though they do not have any legal entitlement to that status. We 
express no opinion on the merits of such a policy decision.”33 It is difficult to avoid seeing an 
implied message in this quotation that though it would probably look good to treat the 
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prisoners in line with Geneva III, there is no need. Bybee also argues that if the President 
chooses as a matter of policy, not law, to adhere to the Geneva Conventions, the possibility of 
prosecuting members of the Taliban torturing American prisoners emerges. Though exactly 
where this prosecution is to take place is somewhat puzzling as the United States does not 
recognize the International Criminal Court. Presumably Bybee means that the Taliban can be 
prosecuted in the federal court system or by military commission. 
The final point Bybee makes is that there are several occasions since World War II 
when the United States have decided that Geneva III does not apply by law, however they 
have always acted consistent with Geneva III or applied it as a matter of policy, and therefore 
always provided for prisoners as if they were entitled to POW status.34 This final point adds 
some confusion to Bybee’s reasoning as it shows that the U.S. has always provided for its 
prisoners, even when it did not have to. This seems to be in direct contradiction with the 
impressive legal justifications Bybee has supplied up to this point in the memo. The 
conclusion may be a tentative attempt by Bybee to underscore the fact that even though Bybee 
and the OLC believe that the United States is in its full right to suspend Geneva III with 
regard to Afghanistan, al Qaeda and the Taliban, such a suspension has never been done 
before. In other words it may serve as a warning that a policy decision resulting in the 
dismissal of the WCA and Geneva III will be a journey into uncharted waters. 
In Part IV Bybee moves on from the legal applicability of Geneva III to the Taliban and al 
Qaeda, to the requirements made by Geneva III regarding detention facilities and conditions. 
He opens by stating that if the President should choose not to suspend Geneva III obligations 
towards Afghanistan, and in turn al Qaeda and the Taliban, there are still reasons to deviate 
from the text and requirements of it. The first reason is that deviations from Geneva III may 
be justified as a matter of self-defense and “some basic doctrine of force protection.”35
Quoting Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,36 Bybee opines that because the United States was 
attacked on September 11, 2001, it has a right to defend itself. This right extends to taking 
certain measures to protect the soldiers guarding prisoners, taken in the War on Terror, “who 
pose a threat to [the soldiers’] lives and safety”37 even if these measures were to deviate from 
Geneva III requirements. He continues his argument by stating that: “as a matter of domestic 
law, the United States armed forces can modify their Geneva III obligations to take into 
account the needs of military necessity to protect their individual members”38 (emphasis 
added). In hindsight it is hard to imagine how a prisoner at GTMO could pose a serious threat 
to any guard even when it was still a temporary facility, though assuming that Bybee’s 
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unlikely assertion that the guards were in danger was correct, the self-defense argument seems 
valid in both in terms of international and U.S. domestic legislation. His other argument, that 
the U.S. armed forces can modify its Geneva III obligations, is less convincing however. 
Presumably Bybee believes that because the President is the Commander in Chief under the 
constitution, and because the President has the unilateral power to interpret treaties according 
to Bybee, this leaves the armed forces with the option of modifying its obligations. Such a 
reading of the U.S. Constitution and Geneva III effectively grants the executive branch of 
government with an almost unlimited ability to revise and interpret legislation which was 
almost certainly not intended by the drafters of the Constitution or Geneva III. This would 
also be a significant expansion of the President’s powers, and serves as another example of 
how the administration used principles from the unitary executive again and again in order to 
achieve its desired goal.
Moving on to what status the Taliban prisoners would have if the President chooses to 
uphold U.S. obligations under Geneva III, Bybee still contests that they may not receive POW 
status. Providing that the President chooses to uphold Geneva III obligations, the conflict in 
Afghanistan would fall under common article 2 which would extend its jurisdiction to include 
common article 4 entitling all prisoners taken to POW status. Bybee moves right on to how 
this provision can be circumvented saying that the President can simply “determine 
categorically that all Taliban prisoners fall outside article 4,” because “[u]nder Article II of 
the Constitution, the President possesses the power to interpret treaties on behalf of the 
Nation.”39 Again the principles of coordinate construction and implied powers are brought up 
to defend what the President can and cannot do, but what is even more interesting with this 
specific quote is that Bybee adds a notation to his argument to provide a precedent for the 
President’s interpretative powers under the constitution. The notation refers to a memo sent 
from John C. Yoo and Robert J. Delahunty of the OLC to the National Security Council 
(NSC) on November 15, 2001 titled “Re: Authority of the President to Suspend Certain 
Provisions of the ABM Treaty.”40 In other words the precedent for the implied presidential 
power comes from Bybee’s own deputy at the OLC and is, at the time of the Bybee Memo, 
two months old. As legal precedents go this seems unconvincing at best, but Bybee continues: 
“A presidential determination of this nature would eliminate any legal “doubt” as to the 
prisoners’ status, as a matter of domestic law, and would therefore obviate the need for 
[common] article 5 tribunals.”41 This is another dramatic increase of presidential powers, and 
highly controversial, since this would mean that there is no need for the judiciary in foreign 
policy. If the president can simply determine that any prisoners taken by the U.S. military is 
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not eligible for protections from Geneva III or domestic legislation, both domestic and 
international courts become superfluous since the president has determined that the prisoner 
can be tried by military commission set up by the military order described earlier in the 
chapter. 
Having determined that even if the president should decline to suspend Geneva III 
obligations to Afghanistan the Taliban prisoners does not have POW status or the right to a 
status review, Bybee uses the next four paragraphs of the memo to remove any further legal 
hindrances potentially set up by Geneva III or the WCA. In summary the determinations made 
by Bybee should the president uphold Geneva III obligations while categorically determining 
that no Taliban prisoners are entitled to POW status are as follows. Firstly if the DOD should 
decide that the Taliban had always violated the requirements set out by common article 4 –
recognizable sign etc. – a categorical rejection of POW status by the President is justified. 
This would mean that the executive branch would have to determine that the conflict in 
Afghanistan is a conflict between two state parties, covered by common article 2. This would 
not invoke common article 4 however since Bybee already has “proved” that it has no 
jurisdiction on its own. Secondly such a determination would not trigger the WCA since the 
WCA only “criminalizes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or violations of common 
article 3” and because “[i]f the President were to find that Taliban prisoners did not constitute 
POWs under article 4, they would no longer be persons protected by the Convention”42
(emphasis added). Because the Taliban prisoners are not POWs, nor in fact protected by the 
Convention at all, their treatment can not be a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. 
Thirdly since the President has determined that the conflict is a common article 2 conflict, 
common article 3 will not apply at all since Bybee has rejected the opinion that it is a “catch-
all” provision and only refers to civil wars, “therefore any violation of its terms would not 
constitute a violation of the WCA.”43
The summary in the paragraph above shows an impressive ability to find loopholes in 
legislation and then using them for all they are worth. Not only is Bybee able to determine 
that some provisions of Geneva III and the WCA are not applicable regardless of what policy 
choice the President makes, he is also able to “prove” that Taliban forces are not protected by 
the Geneva Conventions regardless of the Presidents suspension of the same Conventions 
with respect to Afghanistan. What he refers to as a “difficult legal question” in the beginning 
of Part III of the memo ends up with the opinion that no legislation, international or domestic, 
can protect the Taliban prisoners, as long as the President defines the prisoners as not being 
protected by Geneva III. 
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The memo builds up an impressive legal argument in favor of its findings, but the 
reader is left with the feeling that the importance of getting away with doing as little as 
possible, and interpreting any form of legislation so it fits the administration’s agenda 
overrides any other concerns. The findings also rest on implied powers and interpretations to 
such an extent as that without them any legal defense or justification found in the memo 
disappears. 
2.2 The Gonzales Memo
The Gonzales Memo is a short outline of what the DOJ found in the Bybee Memo, why Colin 
Powell requested the reconsideration and then a list of points weighing the pros and cons of 
following the legal opinion expressed in the Bybee Memo, before a new list of points gives 
Gonzales’ conclusion of this reconsideration. In the first paragraph Gonzales writes: “I 
understand that you [President Bush] decided that GPW does not apply and, accordingly, that 
al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not prisoners of war under the GPW.”44 The fact that 
Gonzales understands that Bush had already made a decision in line with the Bybee Memo is 
important to keep in mind as it may have influenced Gonzales’ conclusion if the policy 
process was influenced by groupthink. 
In the second paragraph Gonzales writes that Colin Powell has requested that the 
president reconsider Bybee’s findings and conclude that GPW – or Geneva III – does apply to 
the Taliban and al Qaeda. This would be a complete reversal of the decision Bush had already 
made, and is indicative of how strongly Powell disagreed with the findings of the Bybee 
Memo. According to Gonzales, Powell consented that “al Qaeda and Taliban fighters could be 
determined not to be prisoners of war (POWs) but only on a case-by-case basis following 
individual hearings before a military board.”45 This means that Powell insists on following 
Geneva III, as the status review Powell refers to is the same as what is outlined in article 5 of 
Geneva III, and the same article that Bybee concluded could be circumvented by a categorical 
determination by the President that no al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were POWs. These few 
sentences of the memo tells a significant story because they give an understanding of both the 
process, decisions made, and protests occurring within the executive branch regarding the 
initial decision of how the detainees should be treated, and what legal protections they were 
entitled to. The fact that Gonzales outlines what the DOJ opined in the Bybee Memo, and also 
how and why Colin Powell protested Bush’s subsequent policy decision may indicate that 
Bush ran the administration like a business as David Mitchell proposes.46 By repeating the 
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findings of the Bybee Memo, and describing the debate caused by Powell’s protest, Gonzales 
functions as a filter of information, what Mitchell calls a “gatekeeper,” and it also indicates 
that the conflict and debate within the administration took place below the level of the 
President, which is in line with Mitchell’s description of a formal system with a high level of 
centralization.47 However in Mitchell’s system the President is not necessarily made aware of 
the conflict, as differing views are excluded,48 and Mitchell also presumes that the role of 
gatekeeper is filled by then National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice.49 Whether or not 
Gonzales can be labeled as gatekeeper in this situation is not readily apparent, but it is 
probable that it would be incorrect as Gonzales was the General Counsel to the President, and 
only one of many advisors when the memo was written. Even though Gonzales as gatekeeper 
and the conflict being brought to the attention of the President by Gonzales may not conform 
to Mitchell placing Bush in a formal, highly centralized system, does not necessarily mean 
that Mitchell is wrong. What the Gonzales Memo does serves as an example of is that it 
seems that Bush were running the White House like a business, where the leader (President) 
chooses the option he sees as best after being presented with a few available options.50
Continuing the memo Gonzales moves on the legal background and begins by noting 
that Bush as president has “the constitutional authority to make the determination (…) that the 
GPW does not apply to al Qaeda and the Taliban.”51 This is a repetition of the implied powers 
described in the Bybee Memo, but as opposed to the Bybee Memo Gonzales does not make 
reference from which part of the Constitution this authority derives. Gonzales then repeats the 
prime findings of the Bybee Memo, that Bush could choose to apply Geneva III as a matter of 
policy, that Geneva III does not apply to al Qaeda, and that the president can determine 
categorically that Geneva III does not apply to the Taliban because Afghanistan was a failed 
state, or because the Taliban was a terrorist organization.52 The closing paragraph of this 
section of the memo states that the interpretation made by the OLC (Bybee) in this case is 
definitive, and that the “Attorney General is charged by statute with interpreting the law for 
the Executive Branch.”53 The Attorney General can, and has, delegated this authority, which 
extends to both domestic and international legislation, to the OLC. “Nevertheless, you should 
be aware that the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State [William H. Taft IV] has expressed a 
different view [than the opinion provided in the Bybee Memo].”54 By adding the final 
sentence as an afterthought, Gonzales arguably can be said to relegate the State Department to 
a whiner who does not work with the team. It seems like Gonzales only mentions it to alert 
the President to the fact that not everyone is pulling in the same direction, which may be an 
indication of one of the symptoms of groupthink listed by Janis. By relegating the differing 
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
28
view to an afterthought of the majority opinion within the administration, Gonzales 
effectively tries to silence the opposing view even if he mentions it. This is what Janis calls a 
Type III symptom of groupthink indicating a pressure to conform to the majority opinion, 
though this pressure is not directed to the dissenters in the State Department it indicates to the 
President that the differing view is of little importance.
Gonzales continues by listing the positive ramifications of adhering to “what I 
understood to be your earlier determination that the GPW does not apply to the Taliban.”55
The first point he makes is that by deciding that Geneva III does not apply to al Qaeda and the 
Taliban is that such a decision would preserve flexibility in the conflict. Because the War on 
Terror is a new kind of war it is important to quickly obtain information from terrorists to 
prevent further attacks on the U.S. Gonzales argues that quick information gathering is in fact 
so important that “[it] renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning (…) and 
renders quaint some of its provisions.”56 Further Gonzales observes that even though some of 
the “quaint provisions,” like providing athletic uniforms and scientific instruments to 
prisoners, does not extend to prisoners who are not POWs, a determination of non-application 
will remove any arguments for case-by-case status reviews and keep options open for future 
conflicts in which it may be more difficult to determine the enemy’s POW status.57 By only 
naming the “quaint provisions” and not the potential humanitarian ramifications of non-
application of Geneva III, Gonzales effectively relegates the entire Geneva Conventions from 
an important piece of human rights legislation to an old and silly piece of unnecessary 
protections. It is also an indication that the administration believes that the maltreatment of a 
few “bad guys” is acceptable in order to prevent potential harm coming to the U.S. If that is 
the case it is an example of “The Bush Doctrine” in action. By preemptively detaining a 
prisoner without providing him with the necessary protections afforded POWs in order to stop 
the prisoner of potentially harming the United States, the administration acts in line with the 
Bush Doctrine.
The second positive ramification of non-application as Gonzales sees it is that it 
“Substantially reduces the threat of domestic criminal prosecution under the [WCA].”58 It is 
understandable that the administration is interested in avoiding any form of criminal 
prosecution for their actions regardless of their intention, so this is definitely a positive 
ramification for the administration. Gonzales continues by saying that because the WCA 
includes undefined language, for instance that it prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity and 
inhumane treatment,”59 and because it is difficult to predict what would violate this 
prohibition, Gonzales deems it easier to decide upon non-application. Additionally because it 
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is difficult to foresee future needs in the war on terror, and to predict the motivations of 
prosecutors to bring “unwarranted charges” against the administration, the safest thing is 
simply to avoid the whole situation by choosing non-application.60 The entire point of 
avoiding prosecution under the WCA indicates that the administration knows it is moving in 
legal grey areas and believes that someone is out to “get” the administration. Kelley argues 
that this behavior is another aspect of the unitary executive, as the unitary executive assumes 
that it operates in a hostile environment and needs to protect itself.61 It seems astounding that 
Gonzales believes that “inhumane treatment” is an unclear wording, even though the language 
of the WCA does not clearly define what constitutes inhumane treatment, it is safe to assume 
that the administration has an idea of what it means, especially when considering Bush’s 
military order calling for humane treatment of prisoners. The administration’s actions in the 
years after these memos were sent do indicate that “humane-” and “inhumane treatment” were 
malleable terms however.
After pointing out that the positive ramifications of non-application were flexibility 
and avoiding prosecution, Gonzales moves on to the negative ramifications. It is unclear 
whether these arguments were made by Colin Powell in his request for reconsideration, but 
Gonzales lists several arguments for reversing the decision not to apply Geneva III to the 
prisoners. Without going into significant detail he lists a total of seven points: (1) non-
application has never been done before, (2) it would be impossible for the U.S. to invoke 
Geneva III if enemy forces mistreated U.S. or coalition forces captured, (3) the WCA could 
not be used to prosecute the enemy, (4) non-application would likely provoke “widespread 
condemnation [from] allies and in some domestic quarters,”62 (5) it may encourage others to 
find loopholes in their Geneva III obligations, (6) other countries would be less inclined to 
hand over terrorist suspects to the U.S., and finally (7) it could undermine U.S. military 
culture “which emphasizes (…) the highest standards of conduct in combat.”63 This list is 
impressive and seems more persuasive than the positive ramifications, and helps to underline 
that the determination made by the OLC in the Bybee Memo may not be all that desirable 
since it would be like heading into uncharted waters while removing all protections from 
American personnel, encouraging others to condemn the United States, do the same as the 
United States, or damage soldier morale. Gonzales immediately tackles these negatives with 
counterarguments and finds that the negative ramifications are unpersuasive reasons to 
reconsider and reverse the president’s decision. Saying that the argument regarding how non-
application has never been done before is technically incorrect, as it was determined that 
Geneva III did not apply in George H. W. Bush’s invasion of Panama in 1989, it was only 
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determined that as a matter of policy that Geneva III would be followed with respect to 
“regular foreign armed forces.”64 Gonzales understands this to mean that they would not 
apply Geneva III to non-regular forces, like al Qaeda and the Taliban were in the Afghanistan 
conflict. 
Moving on to the arguments of being unable to prosecute the enemy for maltreatment, 
and encouraging others to find loopholes, Gonzales observes that as long as Bush intends to 
treat the prisoners humanely this gives the U.S. the power to insist on similar treatment for 
their soldiers. At the same time if Geneva III is not applicable the U.S can still prosecute their 
adversaries for war crimes using other statutes and laws than the WCA and Geneva III.65 It is 
unclear why the same statutes and laws can not be used to prosecute Americans, but Gonzales 
does not address that. He concludes his point by noting that “our adversaries in several recent 
conflicts have not been deterred by GPW in their mistreatment of captured U.S. personnel, 
and terrorist will not follow GPW rules in any event.”66 Though that statement in all 
likelihood is correct, it does not invoke the image of a moral, military and political leader of 
the world. Even if the administration assumes that the opposition is too evil, or indifferent to 
follow the Geneva Conventions it does not justify ignoring the same conventions, it only 
helps to underline that what the administration is doing may not be the best policy. The 
assumption that the opposition will not follow Geneva III is another symptom of groupthink. 
Janis calls this a stereotyped view of the enemy as being too evil to warrant negotiation. 
Though it is unlikely that al Qaeda or the Taliban would agree to negotiate with the United 
States, or that the United States would negotiate with terrorists, the administration seems to 
have decided upon a stereotype in line with what Janis describes.67  It may also be an 
indication of another symptom Janis describes as an “unquestioned belief in the groups 
inherent morality,” which may cause the group to ignore ethical or moral consequences of its 
decision.68
As for the condemnation from allies and domestic sources, Gonzales concludes that 
there is already some criticism out there because of Bush’s decision to withhold POW status 
from the detainees, and as long as the U.S: “reassur[es] them that we fully support GPW 
where it is applicable,”69 (emphasis added) the negative effects of condemnation from allies 
will be lessened, or not come at all. Several factors will still continue to constrain U.S. 
treatment of the detainees because it is committed to “treat the detainees humanely and, to the 
extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the 
principles of GPW,” and “minimum standards of treatment universally recognized by the 
nations of the world.”70 One could argue that as long as one intends to treat the prisoners in 
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line with the principles of Geneva III while upholding “minimum standards of treatment 
universally recognized,” it may be easier to simply apply Geneva III after all. It is also 
interesting that the United States promises to treat the detainees humanely, while it at the 
same time is uncertain of the meaning of “inhumane.” 
Moving to the final point of undermining military culture, Gonzales concludes that 
this will not happen as the military will “apply the principles of GPW because that is what 
you have directed them to do,” 71 presumably in the military order of November 13, 2001. 
Again this makes the reader wonder if application of Geneva III would be just as easy as the 
intended policy of non-application with humane treatment. 
The Gonzales Memo only serves as an affirmation of the Bybee Memo, though it 
provides a presentation of the dissenting opinion of Colin Powell even if the dissenting 
opinion is not written by Powell’s hand. It also implies that, at least initially, it was the policy 
of the administration to treat the prisoners humanely, which may not necessarily be a 
redeeming factor when we know what eventually happened to some of the detainees. By 
concluding with the same opinion as was outlined by Bybee in the first memo, and the 
decision President Bush had already made, Gonzales provides another symptom of 
groupthink. Janis writes about shared illusions of unanimity within the group causing self-
censorship.72 When writing the memo Gonzales already knew that the President had made a 
decision based on the opinion of the Bybee Memo, and may have been influenced to such a 
degree by the President’s policy decision that he simply gave the President what he believed 
that the President wanted to hear. If that is the case, then David Mitchell’s argument that Bush 
moved from a low to a high form of centralization becomes more convincing as well. When 
describing the different forms of solutions the systems within ASF produce, Mitchell writes 
that formal systems with either high or low centralization will produce solutions that are 
geared towards the president’s world views and preferences, but in a system with high 
centralization conflict is discouraged and not brought to the attention of the President.73 By 
including Powell’s request and arguments for reconsideration, Gonzales does not exclude the 
conflicting view, but he does gear his final conclusion towards what the president has already 
decided, which would be largely in line with a formal system with low centralization, or what 
Mitchell calls a “dominant-subset” solution.74
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2.3 Conclusion
The two memos analyzed in this chapter does several things, the most significant of which is 
to remove any protections provided by the Geneva Conventions from al Qaeda and Taliban 
prisoners taken in Afghanistan, effectively leaving the prisoners without any protections at all 
apart from the U.S. Constitution. Though the protection provided by the Constitution is 
significant, the memos also showed that the unitary executive principle of coordinate 
construction was largely accepted within the administration, meaning that the President would 
be able to interpret or define the Constitution in a way as to not provide protection to the 
detainees. Gonzales also wrote in his memo that “inhumane treatment” was unclear language 
and hard to define, meaning that the administration believed that the definition of “humane” 
and “inhumane” were up for discussion as well, and as long as the administration believed it 
had the power to interpret the Constitution, the protections provided by it became even more 
uncertain.
There seems little doubt that the unitary executive principles presented by Kelley were 
in use in the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency. The extensive use of coordinate 
construction indicates as much, as do the apparent belief within the administration that the 
President had to protect himself and the executive branch from a hostile environment in which 
the other branches of government could potentially bring charges against the administration. 
One can find several symptoms of groupthink in the policy debate that occurred 
regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions to al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners. Even 
though the two memos do not discuss alternatives to the final policy outcome to any large 
degree, the Gonzales Memo describes how the Colin Powell and State Department lawyers 
protested the initial decision made by Bush, but effectively relegates the opposing arguments 
to nuisances not worth considering. The symptoms of groupthink which are found – belief in 
the group’s inherent morality, stereotyped views of the enemy, and an illusion of unanimity –
do not provide enough evidence to make it possible to conclude that groupthink occurred 
however. Janis’ includes four antecedent conditions and writes that groupthink is unlikely to 
occur without these.75 Two of these antecedent conditions are unlikely to have been present in 
the policy choice of non-application of Geneva III, these are the insulation of the policy-
making group making it impossible to confer with experts,76 and that the policy making group 
was under psychological stress or pressure.77 With respect to the first antecedent condition it 
is hard to argue that Bybee and Gonzales were unable to confer with experts, as they 
essentially can be said to be experts in so far as the fact that they are both lawyers and the 
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memos discuss different legal hurdles presented by non-application of Geneva III. Regarding 
psychological stress or pressure it is hard to say whether the President, Gonzales, or Bybee 
were exposed to that, but the military situation in Afghanistan at the time the memos were 
written was still under control and there are no indications that the situation was particularly 
stressful. Janis also writes that one must answer four key questions in order to conclude that 
groupthink occurred, one of the questions is whether or not the antecedent conditions are 
present.78 As long as the antecedent conditions were not, it would be difficult to conclude that 
groupthink occurred, but it may be safe to say that some degree of groupthink was present in 
influencing the policy outcome.
With respect to Mitchell’s ASF, there are indications that George W. Bush moved 
from a formal system with low centralization towards one with high centralization, just as 
Mitchell argues. The discussion that took place was presented to the President in the Gonzales 
Memo, but the opinions in both memos were geared towards what the President wanted, and 
Bush did not partake in the debate to any large degree. There is also evidence that Bush ran 
the White House as a business, which is in line with a formal system in Mitchell’s framework.
The title of this thesis indicates that there is a lot of power in the ability to define. The 
two memos analyzed in this chapter show just that in several ways. The Bybee Memo argued 
that the Taliban could not be defined as a government, and that Afghanistan could be defined 
as a failed state. The consequence of those definitions was that the administration decided not 
to provide POW-status and –protections to the Taliban prisoners. The memos also indicate 
that the administration had redefined, or that they were under way of redefining, presidential 
power to include the unitary executive principle of coordinate construction. The increase in 
presidential powers this redefinition caused are staggering as there did not seem to be any 
need for Congress or the judiciary in conducting foreign relations anymore. This expansion of 
presidential powers and additional redefinitions of prisoners and prisoner status would only 
increase as the next chapters of this thesis shows.
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3.0 Banning Torture by Redefinition
This chapter analyzes part of the signing statement George W. Bush included when signing 
the 109th Congress’ House Resolution 2863 (HR 2863) into law on December 30, 2005. The 
bill’s full name is “Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to 
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006” (Public Law 
109-148). Because HR 2863 is an emergency appropriations bill, it included several unrelated 
pieces of legislation, among them the Detainee Treatment Act 2005 (DTA), also known as the 
McCain Torture Ban, as Title X of the bill. 
The inclusion of the DTA was spurred on when evidence that prisoners in U.S. 
custody were maltreated and even tortured emerged. The most significant evidence of 
maltreatment emerged in late April 2004 when pictures from the Abu Ghraib prison outside of 
Baghdad were publicized.1 The pictures were graphic in their conveyance of the maltreatment 
that occurred, showing smiling American personnel beside dead prisoners, prisoners fitted 
with dog collars, naked prisoners stacked into human pyramids, or terrified prisoners being 
threatened with dogs. The Army’s investigation into the maltreatment began in January 2004 
and was conducted by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, who filed his report on the 
incidents to the Department of Defense in March. In the report he concluded that: “Numerous 
incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several 
detainees,”2 and he even said that he had seen a video of “[an] American soldier in uniform 
sodomizing a female detainee.”3 The horrors of what happened is not discussed in great detail 
in this chapter, but the facts of the scandal provide a very important context for why the DTA 
was included in HR 2863, and Bush’s subsequent signing statement.
Before the signing statement is analyzed it is appropriate to provide some additional 
context to it. The first, and most important context apart from the Abu Ghraib scandal, is the 
administration’s creation of a new term for defining prisoners of war, the “enemy combatant.” 
Then the chapter provides a brief outline of what a presidential signing statement is, and how 
it has traditionally been used, before revisiting the Abu Ghraib scandal and the process of 
passing the DTA.
The signing statement provides several examples that the unitary executive continued 
to be the governing ideology within the administration in Bush’s second term, and this chapter 
provides an extension to Christopher S. Kelley’s findings from Bush’s first term. In fact the 
signing statement itself serves as proof that belief in the unitary executive remained strong in 
the administration since Kelley points out that one of the most central tenets in the unitary 
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executive theory is that president’s use signing statements to uphold the office’s prerogatives.4
In this case George W. Bush used a signing statement in order to avoid enforcing a piece of 
legislation he was not happy with.
It also proves helpful to look at what happened after HR 2863 was signed into law in 
terms of how the judiciary responded to Bush’s signing statement. In the majority opinion in 
Hamdan v Rumsfeld the Supreme Court directly addresses Bush’s signing statement –
referring to it as “[t]he government’s argument”5 –  the ruling forced Bush to get a firmer 
legal backing for his decisions in the signing statement; this came through the Military 
Commissions Act 2006 (MCA). 
There is no evidence of groupthink in the signing statement itself, but if the findings of 
the last chapter and the process leading up to the torture ban and signing statement are 
included, one can argue that the symptoms found in Chapter 2 are present in the larger 
executive process.  These symptoms are themselves not enough to conclude that groupthink 
occurred, but it is safe to argue that the symptoms present serve as proof that the 
administration had no intention of reconsidering its policies toward the prisoners. The 
symptoms also show that though it may be wrong to conclude that groupthink occurred, there 
was a degree of groupthink present in the process of deciding how to treat the prisoners. 
3.1 Enemy Combatants
The creation of the term “enemy combatants,” proves to be one of the most central arguments 
for showing the consequences of the power of definition held by the Bush administration. The 
General Counsel to the Department of Defense (DOD), William J. Haynes II, sent a 
memorandum to the Council on Foreign Relations on December 12, 2002.6 In the memo 
Haynes explains what an enemy combatant is, who can be arrested as an enemy combatant, 
who has the authority to detain enemy combatants, and the rights the enemy combatants will 
be afforded.
Haynes begins by stating that the United States is at war and during wartime the 
President has the legal authority to detain enemy combatants until the conflict ends.7 He then 
defines exactly what constitutes an enemy combatant, “an individual who (…) may be 
detained for the duration of an armed conflict,”8 and that in the ongoing conflict an enemy 
combatant is “a member, agent, or associate of al Qaida or the Taliban.”9 Critics, among them 
Howard Ball a law professor at Vermont Law School, have argued that the term is legally 
meaningless, as the traditional definitions of prisoners taken during wartime is either lawful-, 
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
38
or unlawful combatant, or innocent civilian.10 Ball argues that before George W. Bush 
declared the War on Terror the term “enemy combatant” had been used once before in judicial 
history, in the Supreme Court case Ex. Parte Quirin (1942), to describe the behavior of an 
unlawful prisoner.11
Haynes says that the term “enemy combatant” has two sub-categories, “unlawful 
enemy combatant,” and “lawful enemy combatant,” two terms which are almost identical to 
the traditional terms excepting the word “enemy.” The “lawful enemy combatants” will 
receive POW-status, while the “unlawful enemy combatants” will not.12 Haynes continues by 
pointing out what Chapter 2 of this thesis showed, that all al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners 
would be barred from POW status, because the President could determine that they did not 
satisfy the criteria for receiving said status.13 As for who has the authority to detain and decide 
the status of the enemy combatants, that authority rests with the President, who may choose to 
delegate the authority to military commanders.14
Howard Ball argues that after the term “enemy combatant” was created the separation 
between “lawful-“ and “unlawful combatant” disappeared, in contradiction to what Haynes 
outlines, and that all the prisoners held by the U.S. military were “enemy combatants,” in 
Ball’s own words: “There were no innocents and no prisoners of war in the war on terror.”15
There are indications that the distinction between “lawful-,” and “unlawful enemy 
combatants” disappeared fairly quickly. In fact eight paragraphs below where Haynes 
mentioned the distinction, the distinction is gone as Haynes writes that:
[E]nemy combatants have no right to counsel to challenge their detention. 
Providing enemy combatants a right of access to counsel could thwart our ability to 
collect critical information and could imperil efforts to prevent further terrorist 
attacks.16
The DOD had also determined that enemy combatants who were not citizens of the United 
States would be barred from challenging their detention with a writ of habeas corpus.17 This 
right would not be withheld from U.S. citizen enemy combatants, but as long as the U.S. 
citizens were labeled as enemy combatants, they would presumably lose their right to an 
attorney. Haynes refers to a court case testing the removal of access to an attorney, in which 
the administration lost as the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found, 
in Padilla v. Bush, that the President had the right to detain U.S. citizen Jose Padilla as an 
enemy combatant, but the court rejected that Padilla would not get access to an attorney. 
Haynes also notes that the administration was reviewing the court’s decision.18
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
39
Howard Ball describes the case of Jose Padilla in some detail, Padilla was arrested in 
2002 on the suspicion of being a member of al-Qaeda, but the administration was unable to 
prove his connection to the terrorist organization. Padilla was eventually charged with a 
federal crime, and moved to a federal facility awaiting his trial in 2005, but Padilla’s attorney 
was advised that Padilla could be detained again as an enemy combatant if he was acquitted in 
the federal court system.19 Padilla’s case serves as chilling evidence of how the Bush 
administration viewed the enemy combatants as the administration clearly reserved the right 
to remove any right a person had, citizen or non-citizen alike, even if the person had been 
proven to be innocent of the crimes the administration accused him of having committed.
In summary what the Bush administration did was to use its defining powers to create 
a regime in which anyone, citizen and non-citizen alike, could be defined as an enemy 
combatant based on suspicion that they were connected to terrorism. If a person was detained 
as an enemy combatant he would immediately lose the protections provided by the United 
States Constitution and the Geneva Conventions, he could be held for the duration of the War 
on Terror without access to an attorney, and an enemy combatant’s trial would be by military 
commission, and not in the federal court system or a regular court martial.
3.2 Signing Statements
A signing statement is often attached to the signature of the president when he signs a bill into 
law. Kelley argues that the signing statement has received very little attention by scholars, and 
that presidents have taken them much more seriously.20 Philip J. Cooper says that the signing 
statement are announcements, often prepared by the Department of Justice, which have 
several uses, among them identifying provisions or statutes of the bill the president has 
concerns about, presidential interpretation of a law, and directing the executive branch in how 
to implement the law.21 Cooper also calls the signing statement a “different kind of line-item 
veto,”22 and argues that presidents often have gone beyond a line-item veto to become 
“substantive vetoes, (…) usually based on broad-based claims to constitutional authority,”23
not unlike principle of coordinate construction enunciated by the unitary executive theory as 
Chapter 2 shows. The signing statement has been in use since the Monroe administration in 
the early 1800s, but served a largely ceremonial function until it was put to systematic use in 
order to preserve the prerogatives of the presidency under Ronald Reagan.24 Kelley also 
argues that the increased use of signing statements is one of the most important characteristics 
of the unitary executive theory, as their use has skyrocketed since the Reagan 
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administration.25 The signing statement analyzed in this chapter is a good example of how the 
unitary executive administration of George W. Bush used a signing statement as a veto.
3.3 The Abu Ghraib Scandal and Torture
If the two memos in the previous chapter are understood correctly, the decision regarding 
treatment, trial and applicability of Geneva III for the prisoners taken in the War on Terror 
was that the prisoners would not receive Geneva III protections, they would be tried by 
military commissions outside of regular courts martial, and they would be treated as 
humanely as possible in line with “standards universally recognized by the world,” as 
Gonzales’ memo said. Though the non-application of Geneva III and trial by military 
commissions may be controversial, the intention was to, at least, treat the prisoners humanely. 
However, what became apparent when the Abu Ghraib-scandal broke in late April 2004 was 
that the prisoners were not treated properly at all. Initially, military leaders were disgusted, 
but said that the maltreatment was done only “by a small number of soldiers who abused a 
small number of prisoners.”26 Within the following three weeks new photos of the prisoner 
abuse at Abu Ghraib surfaced,27 and information that abuse also took place in Afghanistan 
caused the administration and the military, to launch an investigation of the alleged abuse. 
The administration also promised to provide new guidelines to ensure that prisoners were 
treated with “dignity and respect.”28 In spite of the new guidelines and good intentions of the 
administration and the military, the scandal continued to grow as more gruesome pictures 
emerged from Abu Ghraib,29 and the situation was exacerbated by the surfacing of internal 
government memos regarding prisoner treatment, most prominently the Bybee Torture Memo.
The Bybee Torture Memo contained a very narrow definition of what actually 
constituted torture, and even went as far as to suggest that torture could be justified as long as 
military necessity dictated it, and that prohibiting torture could be unconstitutional.30 Soon 
after the memos surfaced, critics voiced their concern and outrage over what the 
administration had done. The Bybee Torture Memo had been the operative directive used to 
define torture from August 2002, and remained so until it was reversed by the OLC’s new 
head, Daniel Levin in June 2004, after the scandal broke.31 One critic, Noah Leavitt a lawyer 
and former employee of the Department of Justice, argued that the definition of torture the 
administration used with regard to prisoners was not only extremely narrow, it contradicted 
torture definitions used when considering asylum seekers wanting to enter the United States 
based on the fear of being tortured, and that having separate definitions of torture was both 
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“unacceptable and wrong.”32 Leavitt also dismissed the administration’s suggestion that as 
long as torture was used with the purpose of extricating information and not to cause pain it 
could not be defined as torture, as “near-ridiculous,” and wondered if the administration 
would accept its own definition of torture if it was employed on American personnel.33 The 
head of the Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, also directed scathing criticism towards the 
administration and the CIA, claiming that the director of the CIA, Porter Goss, had made 
“misleading statements about the CIA’s use of torture,” and that “[m]any of the interrogation 
techniques (…) amount to torture.”34 One of the interrogation techniques Roth claimed 
amounted to torture was waterboarding, or simulated drowning. Roth made the argument that 
there was “no doubt that waterboarding is torture, despite the administration’s reluctance to 
say so.”35 The administration’s reluctance to admit, or rather its outright denial, that 
waterboarding is torture remained throughout the Bush Presidency, Vice-President Cheney for 
example maintained that viewpoint in December 2008, as Chapter 1 of this thesis shows. 
In part the rejection of waterboarding being torture by both the CIA and the Vice-
President over several years helps in illustrating one of the central arguments of this thesis, as 
well as its title, the Bush administration and other executive agencies, like the CIA, used their 
power to define, or redefine, the meaning of torture to suit their actions and goals. First the 
administration decided that prisoners taken in Afghanistan would not be protected by the 
Geneva Conventions, and continued by creating a new “label” for the prisoners, the “enemy 
combatant,” a label which had a dubious legal precedent at best and is not mentioned 
anywhere in the Geneva Conventions; coupled with the administration’s redefinition of what 
constituted torture left the detained prisoners scant protections. The interrogation techniques 
were initially only intended to be used on the enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, but 
in Bush, the Detainees, and the Constitution, Howard Ball writes that by the summer of 2003 
the administration had become frustrated by the lack of “actionable” evidence coming from 
interrogations in Iraq, so Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered military officials in 
Iraq to “‘Gitmo-ize’ the interrogation techniques,”36 meaning that the administration would 
use the same methods for interrogating prisoners in Iraq as they did at GTMO. With this 
knowledge the pictures from Abu Ghraib become even more horrifying as there is reason to 
believe that the maltreatment in Abu Ghraib was a result of the “Gitmo-ization” of the 
interrogation techniques in Iraq, meaning that what happened in Abu Ghraib prison probably 
took place in the prison facilities at Guantanamo Bay at an earlier stage of the War on Terror.
The scandals of 2004 eventually led to the introduction of a “torture ban” in Congress, 
and on December 14, 2005 the torture ban, sponsored by among others Senator John McCain 
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(R-AZ), was voted into the defense appropriations bill by the House of Representatives. 
McCain was vocal in his criticism, and having endured torture as a prisoner of war of the Viet 
Cong during the Vietnam War he knew the horrors it entailed. McCain, a prominent member 
of the Senate, had also lost the bid to become the Republican nominee for President to George 
W. Bush in 2000, after Bush allegedly employed underhand tactics in the primary election in 
South Carolina. Bush agreed to the inclusion of the torture ban the next day after meeting with 
John McCain and the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R-VA).37 In 
spite of threats from the Armed Services Chairman in the House, Duncan Hunter, that he 
would block its inclusion,38 the torture ban was included as Title X of HR 2863, it is also 
known as the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).39 The DTA includes several different 
sections, perhaps the most important ones being Sections 1002 and 1003 which lay out 
uniform standards for interrogation techniques and a prohibition on “cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment of persons under custody or control of the United States 
government.”40 The DTA also defines cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment 
as what is “prohibited by the Fifth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”41
There does not seem to have been any Congressional objections to the administration’s 
creation of the term “enemy combatant,” however as the DTA includes the term in several 
provisions.42 When George W. Bush signed the bill into law on December 30, 2005 he 
included an extensive statement to his signature, and paragraph 8 of the signing statement is 
Bush’s response to the DTA.
3.4 Signing Statement to the DTA
The first sentence of the paragraph in the signing statement relating to the DTA reads as 
follows:
The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to 
detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President 
to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and 
consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will 
assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President, 
evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist 
attacks.43 (Emphasis added).
This is the third time Bush refers to the unitary executive in the signing statement,44 and it 
serves as proof that the unitary executive theory was very much alive in the second 
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
43
administration of George W. Bush, just as Kelley argues for its presence in Bush’s first term. 
Though the sentence itself does not seem to mean anything other than a general 
determination, or warning to the other branches to keep away from the unitary executive 
branch’s prerogatives, the ramifications for the DTA are extensive. Section 1005 of the DTA 
lists several procedures for status review of the persons detained outside of the United States,
among them is a requirement that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the 
Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary in both houses of Congress on the 
procedures of determining the status of detainees already held at Guantanamo Bay, and the 
prisoners taken in Afghanistan and Iraq. The DTA also requires the Secretary of Defense to 
submit an annual, unclassified, report outlining the number of detainees whose status were 
reviewed and the procedures used in such a review, and calls for the creation of a civilian 
office within the Department of Defense which shall be held by a civilian officer appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.45 What President Bush’s first 
sentence does is to nullify any requirement made on the executive branch by Congress in 
Section 1005. The requirements listed in Section 1005 would be infringements on presidential 
power since the President is the only person that has, and can have, control over the executive 
branch according to the adherents to the unitary executive. This means that if one reads Title 
X “in a manner consistent with the unitary executive,” it is probable that all requirements 
made on executive branch officials, and the creation of new offices under the executive 
branch by Congress, are direct violations of Bush’s understanding of the unitary executive 
branch,  and the entire section of the DTA is made void. The final part of the quotation can be 
read as a somewhat veiled proclamation that the President is the Commander in Chief and that 
in order to protect America from further terrorist attacks he is justified in doing what he 
deems necessary without judicial or Congressional interference. By using a signing statement 
in this manner President Bush invokes the prerogatives of the unitary executive in a very 
direct manner, and it serves as a good example of what Kelley refers to as “venture 
constitutionalism,” meaning that the President sees the environment as hostile and in order to 
protect the prerogatives of the presidency he aggressively pushes constitutional boundaries.46
Having disposed of Congressional interference, Bush notes that since “the text and 
structure of Title X do not create a private right of action to enforce Title X, the executive 
branch shall construe Title X not to create a private right of action.”47 In other words, 
according to Bush’s reading of the DTA, individuals who were intended to be protected by 
the DTA do not have the right to invoke the act, as the text of the act does not supply the 
individuals with the right to bring their case before a court. This is very similar to the 
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reasoning found in the Bybee Memo, where Bybee called for textual proof from Geneva III in 
order to accept that common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was a “catch-all” for any 
conflict not covered by common article 2. Bush’s reading also makes the act unenforceable 
for private individuals an act which effectively renders the bill void and continues to withhold 
the rights from the detainees. Following Bush’s logic it seems that his intention is that the 
only function the DTA will serve is that only if someone is caught red-handed by the military, 
or law-enforcement in breaking the provisions of the act, they can be prosecuted under it, but 
the detainees themselves have no right to sue the military if the same provisions are broken 
during interrogations. This is a prime example of “coordinate construction” – that all branches 
of government have the power and duty to interpret both the laws and the Constitution 
independently – which the unitary executive rests upon according to Kelley.48 As Chapter 2 
shows this “executive judicial review” which comes as a result of coordinate construction, 
may remove the need for the judiciary and Congress in foreign relations. The unitary 
executive principles enunciated by the Bush administration have been criticized by Pulitzer 
Prize winning journalist Anthony Lewis who said that the OLC tried to substitute the “basic 
premise of the American constitutional system [with] something like the divine right of 
kings.”49
The final part of Bush’s signing statement to the DTA removes any remaining 
function the act has:
Finally, given the decision of the Congress reflected in subsections 1005(e) and 
1005(h) that the amendments made to section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, 
shall apply to past, present, and future actions, including applications for writs of 
habeas corpus, described in that section, and noting that section 1005 does not 
confer any constitutional right upon an alien detained abroad as an enemy 
combatant, the executive branch shall construe section 1005 to preclude the Federal 
courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over any existing or future action, 
including applications for writs of habeas corpus, described in section 1005.50
The understanding Bush has of the DTA is somewhat in line with the text of the act, as the 
DTA actually restricts the possibility of detainees to submit writs of habeas corpus. The act 
explicitly mentions in Section 1005 (f) that: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
confer any constitutional right on an alien detained as an enemy combatant outside the United 
States.”51 The intention of the DTA is that prisoners detained abroad who have had their 
status reviewed correctly as an “enemy combatant” does not have any constitutional rights. 
This intention is easily side-stepped by Bush by the decisions made based on the findings of 
the internal memos in the last chapter; there was no need for status reviews since the president 
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could unilaterally determine that all al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were not entitled to 
prisoner of war status, thus making them enemy combatants. Therefore any person detained 
by the U.S. military, or bounty hunters, in Iraq or Afghanistan is an enemy combatant by 
default, removing any rights the detainee might have under the U.S. Constitution. This 
removal of, or complete lack of, rights was also valid for U.S citizens detained abroad or even 
within the United States if the president determined them to be enemy combatants according 
to an earlier decision by the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.52 This raises some serious 
questions regarding the rights of citizens in a democracy. If the nation’s leader can determine 
that any citizen, or in fact any person of any country, is a threat to the nation he can 
immediately remove all rights of that person, detain him wherever he wants, and treat him 
without respect to the Geneva Conventions. Though this may happen in countries ruled by 
dictators, it is highly dubious behavior from the leader of one of the world’s oldest still-
existing democracies. 
Bush’s final observation in the portion of the signing statement relating to the DTA is 
that no federal courts shall have jurisdiction to hear any action brought on behalf of, or by, the 
detainees. Section 1005 (e)(2)(A) gives the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of the decisions made by the Combat Status 
Review Tribunals. This means that, according to the DTA, a detainee can bring the decision 
of his status review to the Court of Appeals in D.C. if they contest it, or if they feel that 
procedural inconsistencies occurred when their status was determined. What the last part of 
Bush’s signing statement does is to remove this option by stating that the executive branch 
understands that the federal courts have no jurisdiction under Section 1005. Since it has 
already been decided that no status reviews are necessary in any case, Bush’s signing 
statement makes the entire DTA unenforceable. In three sentences he voids the entire DTA by 
nullifying the section describing how and under what circumstances the DTA is to be 
enforced, and removes any accountability the executive branch has towards Congress, the 
judiciary, or the detainees. Bush leaves the other sections of the DTA, including the torture 
ban and a section regarding the training of Iraqi forces, untouched, but by removing any 
possibility of enforcing and bringing to trial any potential breaches of the act, the torture ban 
ends up being idealistic thinking without any real impact on how detainees should be treated 
and tried. It also leaves the administration with the ability to continue torturing and trying all 
enemy combatants as it has been used to. This argument was brought up by the Boston Globe
in January of 2006 and responded to by an unnamed “senior administration official,” who said 
that the president “reserve[d] the right to use harsher methods,” in order to protect the nation, 
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and that if following the DTA and protecting the nation came into conflict the President had 
to square the two off against each other.53
The actions the administration took with regard to the enemy combatants seem 
shocking to a critical reader. By removing all rights the “enemy combatants” had under the 
United States Constitution and the Geneva Conventions, Bush then made the DTA, an act 
prohibiting torture, unenforceable. The possibility that Bush really believed that he only did 
what he absolutely had to in order to protect the United States, which some commentators 
seem to believe,54 exists, but the accumulation of powers the administration’s use of its 
defining powers caused, effectively replaced the need for the judiciary, Congress, and the 
Constitution with a king as Lewis observed. Eventually the Supreme Court intervened, not in 
how the United States was treating its prisoners, but how they were put to trial.
3.5 Aftermath of the Abu Ghraib Scandal and the DTA
On June 29, 2006, six months after Bush had signed HR 2863 into law, and in doing so 
nullifying the DTA, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.55
Writing the majority opinion Justice John Paul Stevens concluded that the military 
commission used to try Yemeni national Salim Ahmed Hamdan – also known as Osama bin 
Laden’s driver – was unconstitutional as neither the DTA, or the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice gave the president the authority to convene the commission which tried Hamdan, “or 
any other [commission] at Guantanamo Bay”56 (emphasis added). The court recognized that 
the DTA gave the president “a general authority” to convene military commissions to try 
prisoners, but only “in circumstances where justified under the Constitution and laws, 
including the laws of war.”57 The court also rejected the opinion in Bush’s signing statement 
that the federal courts had no jurisdiction over actions brought to them, including writs of 
habeas corpus. What the Hamdan decision boiled down to was that in order to continue using 
military commission to try enemy combatants, President Bush had two options: ask Congress 
to proceed as he was doing, or begin to operate the commissions in line with the regulations 
for ordinary courts martial.58
In a speech held on September 5, 2006 President Bush announced new legislation for 
setting up military commissions,59 just as the Supreme Court had ordered him to in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, this new legislation would be passed just over a month later as the Military 
Commissions Act 2006 (the MCA, Public Law 109-366).60 The Human Rights Watch was 
critical of Bush’s proposal saying that the proposed legislation “would allow the use of 
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statements obtained under coercion, and would allow the accused to be convicted on the basis 
of secret evidence,” and concluding that “the proposed legislation lacks basic procedural 
protections necessary for a fair trial.”61 Quoting the Army’s Deputy Chief of Intelligence, 
Lieutenant General John F. Kimmons saying that “No good intelligence comes from abusive 
interrogation practices,” Human Rights Watch makes a vital point, agreed upon by several 
experts, and even the U.S. Army’s own Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation: torture 
does not work. Howard Ball quotes the field manual’s section 3 titled Prohibition against the 
Use of Force: 
The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and 
inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor 
condoned by the U.S. Government.(…) [It] is a poor technique, as it yields 
unreliable results (…) and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the 
interrogator wants to hear.62 (Emphasis added).
The field manual Ball is quoting was replaced on the same day Bush gave his above 
mentioned speech, and in the new edition techniques such as waterboarding were prohibited, 
however the new Field Manual would not apply to the detainees held by the CIA.63 Faced 
with evidence from the Army’s own field manual on interrogations, the advice of experts that 
torture does not work, and heavy criticism both from organizations like the Human Rights 
Watch, and members of Congress, the administration continued with the same beliefs, 
refusing to back down. Quoting Vice President Dick Cheney in a radio interview on October 
24, 2006, the Human Rights Watch wrote that Cheney maintained the argument that 
waterboarding was, in his view, not torture, and a “no brainer” to use if it could save lives.64
3.6 Groupthink and the Advisory Systems Framework
These sentiments above are in line with several of the symptoms of groupthink, primarily one 
of Janis’ symptoms of over-estimation: “An unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent 
morality, inclining the members to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their 
decisions.”65 This symptom seems to fit very well with regard to the Bush administration and 
its continued insistence on using “alternative procedures of interrogation,” while insisting that 
they work, and do not constitute torture. There seems to be a complete lack of moral or ethical 
considerations with respect to its own actions within the administration to the extent that 
when faced with information that more or less proves that torture does not work, the answer is 
simply that the administration does not condone or use torture. This is another symptom of 
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groupthink which Janis calls “Closed-mindedness”: “Collective efforts to rationalize in order 
to discount warnings or other information that might lead the members to reconsider their 
assumptions before the recommit themselves to their past policy decisions.”66 Just as in the 
internal debate regarding Geneva III application in the last chapter, Bush and his 
administration display symptoms of groupthink, but again it is important to remember that 
even though some symptoms of groupthink are present, it is too hasty to conclude that 
groupthink occurred. In this case, as in the previous chapter, the antecedent conditions Janis 
lists like insulation of the policy-making group, or psychological stress or pressure67 can not 
immediately be said to have been present in the choice to continue torturing the detainees who 
were in the hands of the CIA, nor were they likely present in the formulation and passing of 
the Military Commissions Act. A third symptom of groupthink which is present during this 
process is one of self censorship; that the group censors any deviations from the consensus. 
This was done by replacing the lone critical voice in the administration, Colin Powell, with 
someone who would be more on the same wavelength as the others. David Mitchell argues 
that the two most polarized figures in the Bush administration’s first term were Colin Powell 
and Donald Rumsfeld,68 meaning that by appointing Condoleezza Rice as the new Secretary 
of State in his second term, George W. Bush effectively removed any critical voices from his 
innermost circle thus reinforcing the possibility of groupthink occurring. 
By replacing Colin Powell with Condoleezza Rice, Bush conforms to Mitchell’s place 
for him in the Advisory Systems Framework (ASF) as well. When removing Powell’s critical 
voice Bush helps underline Mitchell’s assertion that differing views are excluded from a 
formal system with a high degree of centralization.69 As for the other aspects of the formal 
high centralization system it is uncertain if Mitchell believes that the promotion of his old 
gatekeeper, Rice, to Secretary of State caused her to lose her role as gatekeeper. Since the 
gatekeeper is the one who filters all information before bringing one or more options to the 
president, it is likely that Rice no longer took on that role. Whether or not the gatekeeper-role 
was taken up Bush’s new National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, is not clear, but Hadley 
would at least conform to the low-conflict aspect of the formal high central in the ASF seeing 
as he had worked on Bush’s campaign in 2000, on the Bush-Cheney transition NSC and had 
held positions under both Reagan and George H. W. Bush’s administrations. It is unlikely that 
there would be much need, or possibility, to filter the criticism directed at Bush and his 
administration regarding the Abu Ghraib scandal and Hamdan v Rumsfeld, when considering 
the amount of controversy and media-attention the scandal got, but in spite of the criticism 
Bush was able to formulate, presumably, what he believed was the best option. 
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3.7 Responding to Hamdan
The administration’s response to the Hamdan verdict was a new piece of legislation,
the same mentioned and criticized by the Human Rights Watch above, the Military 
Commissions Act 2006 (MCA). The MCA was passed by Congress in October 2006,70 and it 
achieved what Bush had set out to do in his signing statement, this time with the help of a 
Republican controlled Congress. The MCA removed the federal court’s jurisdiction to hear 
habeas corpus writs from detainees at Guantanamo and other prison facilities, and actually 
barred the prisoners from submitting the writs at all as long as they were in the detention of 
the U.S. military.71 It also broadened the definition of enemy combatants and gave the 
President the power to “interpret the meaning and the application of the Geneva 
Conventions.”72 What may be the most controversial provision of the MCA in its original 
text, however, was the fact that it rejected the notion that raping a detainee was torture.73 This 
provision shows an almost horrifying view of human rights and the respect for other human 
beings. That the administration, with the help of Congress, was able to include this provision 
seems unbelievable at best and leaves one wondering at what point in a war it is necessary to 
rape a prisoner in order to obtain information that will save lives. 
Having failed to succeed with the unitary executive approach, Bush was able to secure 
a victory in continuing his policies with the help of Congress, however he still was not 
satisfied with what the MCA allowed the CIA to do and what powers it afforded him. To deal 
with this he signed an executive order in July of 2007 which is dealt with in the next chapter. 
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4.0 Interpretation by Executive Order
The Military Commissions Act was a controversial piece of legislation for several reasons, a 
few of which were mentioned in the previous chapter, including a stricter definition of what 
constituted torture. Additionally the MCA said that “any alien unlawful enemy combatant is 
subject to trial by military commission,”1 meaning that as long as the administration 
determined that a non-U.S. citizen was an enemy combatant, he could be tried by military 
commission after being held for an indefinite period of time, and that the evidence brought 
against the enemy combatant in the military commission trial could have been obtained 
through coercion, or remain secret. With respect to the balance of power between the 
branches of government, the MCA completely removed the option of submitting writs of 
habeas corpus to a court. Section 7 of the MCA titled “Habeas Corpus Matters” states that 
“[n]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf on an alien detained by the United States.”2 The 
restriction of habeas corpus privileges was one of the goals President Bush had tried to 
achieve by way of the signing statement to the Detainee Treatment Act discussed in the 
previous chapter. The constitutionality of that section of the MCA remained dubious until the 
Supreme Court eventually addressed it almost two years after the passing of the MCA, in June 
2008.
This chapter begins with a look at how and why the MCA was passed as quickly as it 
was. From the date that the verdict was handed down in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in June 2006, it 
only took the administration four months to negotiate and pass the MCA. The main reasons 
for this hurry was that the 2006 Midterm Elections were fast approaching, and as long as the 
administration had to go through Congress to get its way it made sense to pass the MCA
while both houses of Congress were still in the Republicans’ hands. Some of the provisions 
included in the MCA gave President Bush powers which the unitary executive assumes the 
president has and by passing these provisions, Congress helped make principles found in the 
unitary executive theory into federal law. This inclusion also served to eclipse any further 
need for groupthink within the administration since the President at the point of passing was 
left with almost no obstacles and no checks on his power by the legislative branch. 
The main focus of this chapter rests on an executive order President Bush issued in 
July of 2007.  The executive order is a favored weapon for presidents, used to direct policy or 
avoid dealing with the other branches of government, in other words a weapon that suits the 
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unitary executive very well. Before Bush’s executive order is analyzed there is a short 
explanation of how and why executive orders traditionally have been used. 
As described in the previous chapter, Pentagon issued a new Field Manual which 
prohibited the use of waterboarding when interrogating prisoners, but the prohibition did not 
extend to the prison facilities operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This separation 
indicated that the CIA would be able to continue using interrogation techniques which were 
deemed to constitute torture by many critics. The executive order analyzed in this chapter is 
the result of a sub-paragraph of section 6 of the MCA which says that the President shall issue 
an executive order interpreting the meaning and application of Geneva III.3 The order seems 
to be intended to address the issue of torture, but as the analysis shows, it does not succeed in 
its intentions. The title of the executive order analyzed is “Executive Order 13440 -
Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of 
Detention and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency,”4 but the text of the 
order belies its content. More than anything else, the order confuses more than it interprets, 
and raises more questions than it answers. Whether this is an intentional effect of the order 
remains uncertain, but the analysis indicates as much and one is left with an understanding 
that the order only reaffirms the status quo without bringing any significant policy changes.
The last part of this chapter looks at how the Supreme Court, in Boumediene v. Bush, 
eventually addressed, and struck down the provision of the MCA which barred any court, 
judge or justice from having jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court 
decision functions as the end point of the Bush administration’s policy process and debate 
regarding enemy combatants, military commissions, torture, and the struggle between the 
different branches of U.S. Government addressed in this thesis.
4.1 Battle of the Branches
After a two year tug-of-war between Congress, the Supreme Court and the administration 
George W. Bush seemed to have gotten the final word with the passing of the Military 
Commissions Act in October 2006. Beginning with the Abu Ghraib scandal and the ensuing 
attempt by Congress to rein in the President with the Detainee Treatment Act and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the MCA gave Bush exactly what he 
wanted. Having achieved the necessary legislation to continue with the intended regime of 
trying enemy combatants by military commissions, and obtaining acceptance for the 
administration’s narrow definition of torture, and even if Bush’s “unitary executive approach” 
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– through his signing statement – had failed, he was able to use a friendly Congress to achieve 
his goals. 
The victory was not a decisive one in spite of the success of passing the MCA, 
because the passing showed that the act was very controversial even though it was passed 
with fairly large margins in both houses of Congress. In the House the bill passed with 253 to 
168 votes in a very partisan vote where 219 Republicans and only 34 Democrats voted for the 
bill, while 160 Democrats and a meager 7 Republicans voted against it along with one 
Independent representative.5 Leading representatives in both parties defended or criticized the 
bill after the vote, with Republican Duncan Hunter saying that “[i]n times of war it is not 
practical to apply the same rules of evidence [as] in civil courts trial or courts martial,”6 while 
Democratic Senator Patrick J. Leahy called the bill not only contrary to American interests, 
but also un-American and unconstitutional.7 Duncan Hunter’s words reveal the same view as 
the administration held, that in order to conduct the War on Terror as effectively and 
“practically” as possible, it was necessary to cut a few corners, or ignore a few basic human 
rights. This may indicate that even members of Congress to some degree can be included as 
being members of the policy-making group, and thus be subjected to groupthink as well. That 
would mean stretching the terms and scope of groupthink, something David Mitchell warns 
about – what he calls “conceptual stretching”8 – meaning that one applies concepts to new 
cases whether they are comparable or not, in order to find evidence of, in this case, 
groupthink. It is important to remember that even though a member of one of the other 
branches, in this case Duncan Hunter, holds views supporting the policy-making group and 
the President, Hunter is less likely to be affected by groupthink as he normally is not as 
involved in the policy-making process as members of the executive branch and the 
administration, especially not in the Bush administration where the unitary executive reigned 
supreme.
The voting on the MCA in the Senate followed party lines in much the same way as it 
had in the House, with only one Republican Senator voting against the bill which passed 65 to 
34.9 Leading Democrats continued their criticism of the bill. Hillary Rodham Clinton was 
quoted by the New York Times saying: “we must hold onto our values and set an example we 
can point to with pride, not shame.”10 The party divide showed that even though the bill was 
passed, it was mainly passed by Republicans, many of whom held the same views as the 
administration on how to treat and try enemy combatants, or who wanted to give the President 
what he asked. There were mixed feelings among the Republicans though, and even some 
Republicans who voted for the bill seemed less than enthusiastic about passing the MCA, as it 
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
55
was expected that the Supreme Court would strike down the bill. The main concern was that 
the MCA included a provision which barred the courts from hearing challenges to the 
detainees’ imprisonment,11 the same objective Bush had attempted to achieve with his signing 
statement to the DTA.
The general opinion in Congress seemed to be that the bill was rushed and should have 
been subjected to more thorough debate before being put to the vote. This shared feeling of 
having rushed the passage of the bill was in all likelihood not coincidental, because the 2006 
midterm elections were fast approaching and it seems likely that Bush wanted the bill passed 
through Congress while it was still controlled by the Republican Party. After all Congress had 
been controlled by Bush’s party ever since his first inauguration in 2001, but the public mood 
was changing and it seemed that the Republican Party would lose its majority in Congress in 
2006 for the first time in 10 years. Even if the unitary executive presumes that the presidency 
operates within a hostile environment, Bush had still had a “friendly” Congress and, what was 
deemed by many to be, a conservative Supreme Court as his main opponents for his entire 
presidency. The environment became more hostile just five weeks after the MCA was passed, 
however, when Democrats won control over both Houses in Congress in the midterm 
elections. Obtaining the narrowest possible margin in the Senate, with party affiliation 
counting 49 Democrats, 49 Republicans, and 2 Independents expected to caucus with the 
Democrats,12 the Democratic Party had not received a convincing mandate for reform, 
however. The Democratic gains in the House were more impressive, but they still lacked the 
necessary majority to override presidential vetoes without turning to the Republican Party, 
something that seemed unlikely to succeed considering the strongly polarized situation 
evinced by the vote on the MCA. Some Democrats still tried in any case, among them Senator 
Chris Dodd who attempted to amend the MCA less than two weeks after the midterm 
elections on November 16, 2006.13 The proposed amendments called “the Effective Terrorist 
Prosecution Act,” did not make it out of committee, however, and the MCA remained 
unchanged.
Even though the MCA had survived a polarized Congress, a midterm election, and 
early attempts to amend it, the signals that it probably would not survive for long seemed 
clear. The Democrats controlled Congress, and even Republicans believed that the Supreme 
Court would strike down the MCA eventually. The likelihood of Supreme Court action 
increased in June 2007 when a 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel found that Ali al-
Marri, a Qatari national living legally in the United States, could not be stripped of his 
constitutional right to challenge his detainment, as the MCA opened for. Having been 
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captured in December 2001, al-Marri had been moved to a navy brig in June 2003 and spent 
the following four years in solitary confinement as an enemy combatant.14 In its verdict a 
divided panel said that “[t]o sanction such presidential authority to order the military to seize 
and indefinitely detain civilians, even if the president calls them ‘enemy combatants,’ would 
have disastrous consequences for the Constitution — and the country.”15 The administration 
responded by announcing that it intended to challenge the Appeals panel’s findings, but the 
verdict was a blow for the administration and the MCA nonetheless. Al-Marri’s case is still 
not resolved, but his status as an “enemy combatant” has been rescinded and at the time of 
writing he awaits a civil trial in Illinois, where he was first arrested in 2001.16
Just over a month after the June, 2007 verdict by the Appeals panel, a verdict Bush
wished to render forceless, he employed another favored “weapon” for the executive, the 
executive order. 
4.2 Executive Orders
The executive order is an example of executive direct action in the same way that a signing 
statement is. Presidents issue several executive orders each year for several different reasons. 
In With the Stroke of a Pen, Kenneth R. Mayer calls executive orders “presidential edicts, 
legal instruments that create or modify laws, procedure and policy,” and claims that they 
“often extend far beyond the government.”17 The University of California, Santa Barbara, has 
compiled a collection of all executive orders issued, dating back to John Quincy Adams in 
1826,18 which provides an insight into how Presidents issue orders in different circumstances. 
Mayer writes that the issuance of executive orders rises and falls in response to significant 
events,19 and if one looks at how many executive orders George W. Bush issued in 2001, 
Mayer’s argument becomes clear. In the almost eight months between his inauguration and 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Bush issued 25 executive orders, while in the 
remaining three months of 2001 after the terrorist attacks he issued 29.20 These numbers are 
not necessarily dependable, as some executive orders may be classified, or not published at all 
according to Mayer.21
Philip J. Cooper provides an explanation of why presidents issue executive orders in 
By Order of the President, saying that sometimes the reasons for issuing an executive order 
are connected to the politics and relationship between the president and the other branches, 
while others are issued as responses to certain circumstances.22 Cooper uses a chapter in 
outlining the most common reasons for issuing executive orders. One reason is that executive 
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orders can be issued “to accomplish an end run around Capitol Hill,”23 as Cooper puts it; in 
other words the President issues an executive order to avoid dealing with Congress. In relation 
to this thesis, an “end run around Capitol Hill,” does not apply as it was Congress who called 
for the issuance of the order by including a provision in the MCA ordering the president to do 
so. Another important reason Cooper mentions is that executive orders are used in the 
transition between two administrations to change the policy course from the previous 
administration.24 This is exactly what President Barack Obama did only two days after his 
inauguration, a point that will be discussed in the next chapter. In the context of this chapter 
and the following analysis of Bush’s Executive Order 13440, another vital point Cooper 
brings up is that executive orders may have a symbolic value intended to send a message to a 
certain group of supporters or critics, in this case Bush’s critics, without having to commit 
political, legal or financial resources.25 The analysis of the following order indicates that 
Executive Order 13440 may be such an order.
4.3 Moving Toward a Morally Acceptable Policy? – Executive Order 13440
The title of the executive order Bush issued on July 20, 2007 is in itself a controversial one, 
and in full compliance with the unitary executive principle of “coordinate construction,” but 
at the point of issuance the principle was included in federal legislation. The title also 
specifies that the executive order is only valid for CIA-operated detention facilities, meaning 
that prison and detention facilities operated by the military would not be covered by this 
executive order. This is in line with how the new Field Manual, described in Chapter 3,
separated what the Pentagon and the CIA was allowed to do in interrogations. 
The New York Times wrote about the executive order the day after Bush signed it, and 
in an article by Times journalist Mark Mazzetti, titled “Rules Lay Out C.I.A.’s Tactics in
Questioning,” Mazzetti quoted former administration official and counsel to Condoleezza 
Rice, Philip D. Zelikow, as saying that the order showed that the government was moving 
towards a more moral and legally sustainable area of interrogations.26 The article continues by 
saying that, at the time of writing, there was only one known prisoner held by the CIA, an 
Iraqi Kurd named Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and that it was uncertain if the CIA held any other 
prisoners. It seems unlikely that Bush would issue an executive order that would only have 
ramifications for one prisoner, even if the MCA called for the issuance of the order, so it 
seems likely that the CIA held others, or at least was intending to detain others. The most 
remarkable fact to emerge in the New York Times article is in its final paragraph where CIA 
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officials admit that al-Iraqi had provided “valuable intelligence, despite the fact that C.I.A. 
[sic] interrogators at the time were only authorized to use the techniques approved for 
Pentagon interrogators.”27 This would be a direct argument against the administration’s view 
that “enhanced interrogation methods” were necessary in order to produce “actionable 
evidence.” This may be an indication that the administration had realized that its policies had 
been wrong because it only had allowed “Pentagon approved” interrogation methods in al-
Iraqi’s case. Along with the statement that the executive order moved towards a more moral 
and legal area of interrogations, one could almost assume that the administration was trying to 
modify its policies to accommodate its critics. The New York Times article indicates that there 
had been a lot of discussion within the administration regarding the language of the order 
being a legalization of torture, and that an earlier draft of the order had been rejected for that 
reason.28  If the assumptions found in the Times article were the case then that would indicate 
that the process of drafting the executive order was not affected by groupthink, at least not in 
a similar way that the memos in Chapter 2 of this thesis indicates. Before it is possible to 
answer whether the order signified a break from earlier policies regarding the detention and 
interrogation of detainees, it is appropriate to take a look at what the text of the executive 
order says.
4.3.1 Executive Order 13440 – Executive Direct Confusion
The preamble, or first paragraph, of the executive order is a fairly standard one, outlining the 
sources of presidential powers employed in the order. In this case President Bush lists the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), the MCA, and U.S. Code Title 3 Section 301.29 These specifications are fairly 
standard, though knowing that Republicans in Congress expected that the MCA would be 
struck down by the Supreme Court, and the fact that a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel 
had deemed provisions of the MCA unconstitutional just over a month earlier, this seems to 
serve as an attempt to underscore the validity of the MCA more than the president gaining any 
real powers from it, or rather to make the most use possible of the MCA while it still existed. 
Even though the MCA had not been addressed by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts 
had called the powers the MCA granted the President unconstitutional. Then again the 
issuance of the executive order is a direct result of the MCA, and the inclusion of the MCA in 
the first paragraph is also another hint of the unitary executive and “coordinate construction”
at work, since the administration disagreed with the District Court Appeals panel’s decision 
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and probably intended to fight any action against the MCA. Bush understandably interpreted 
the MCA as valid, which it still was at the time Bush signed the executive order, and included 
it since it did give him expanded powers. The inclusion of Section 301 of title 3 of the U.S. 
Code is also understandable as the relevant section addresses the delegating powers the 
President has – his power to delegate executive responsibilities to department or agency 
officials who have been appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.30
Section 1(a) of the executive order begins with an affirmation that “the United States 
are engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces,”31
(emphasis added). This is not a surprising affirmation by any account, but it is important to 
remember that though the “War on Terror” was invoked after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, no actual declaration of war has been made by Congress, and even 
though Bush had argued that any infringements on the executive would hamper his ability to 
conduct the War on Terror, and that the President as the Commander-in-Chief have a broad 
set of powers in wartime, the ongoing conflict is not legally a war. That does not make the 
conflict any less serious or potentially deadly for the participants, but the fact that the War on 
Terror was unilaterally invoked and overseen by the Bush administration is important to keep 
in mind. The fact that it is not legally a war may to a degree also explain how the 
administration was able to secure a policy of the non-application of Geneva III, because if 
Congress had actually declared war on either Afghanistan or Iraq, the War on Terror would 
have fallen under the Geneva Conventions Common Article 2 – a conflict between two or 
more High Contracting Parties – and the United States would in all likelihood have been 
bound by the Laws of War, something they are not if one is to believe the Bybee Memo 
analyzed in Chapter 2.
Continuing Section 1(a), Bush quickly dispels any belief that the administration 
intended to change its policies by stating that “On February 7, 2002, I determined (…) that 
members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces are unlawful enemy combatants who 
are not entitled to the protections [provided by Geneva III]. I hereby reaffirm that 
determination.”32 By choosing to continue a policy of non-application regarding the enemy 
combatants, Bush continued to ignore the attempts of the Democratic Congress and the 
Supreme Court to rein him in. The DTA, which Bush attempted, but failed to nullify, called 
for proper training of Iraqi officials, including teaching the Iraqis what protections prisoners 
were afforded by the Geneva Conventions.33 Though the training of Iraqi personnel, and how 
the CIA should operate its detention facilities are not directly related, both are bound by the 
same Constitution and code of law, and Bush’s continued dedication to a policy of non-
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application was a clear signal that neither he nor his administration would hear or accept any 
Congressional interference in their conduction of the ongoing conflict. 
Section 1(b) of the executive order refers directly to the MCA and what it does. Most 
importantly for Bush in the context of the executive order is that “[the MCA] reaffirms and 
reinforces the authority of the President to interpret the meaning and application of the 
Geneva Conventions.”34 Howard Ball has included several of the more controversial 
provisions of the MCA in an Appendix to Bush, the Detainees, and the Constitution, and if 
one looks at the original text of the MCA, one finds under Section 6 (3) (A) that the 
Constitution and the relevant section of the MCA grants the President the authority to 
interpret both what the Geneva Conventions mean and their application as long as the 
interpretation does not cause “grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.”35 This makes it 
obvious why President Bush included the MCA in the preamble of the executive order, and 
also astoundingly proves that Bush and his administration were able to include both the 
unitary executive principle of coordinate construction, and the unitary executive interpretation 
of Article 2, Section 2b of the U.S. Constitution regarding treaties into legislation passed by 
Congress. One could argue that the inclusion of these principles into federal law means that 
the unitary executive no longer was an ideology held by the administration, but rather had 
become an institutionalized part of the balance between the branches. Arthur M. Schlesinger 
published The Imperial Presidency in 1973 where he warned that the Presidency was 
becoming too powerful,36 but by actually including principles of the unitary executive in the 
MCA, Congress effectively gave President Bush a helping hand in achieving exactly what 
Schlesinger warned against. If this is the case then there does not seem to be any validity in 
groupthink any longer since it is difficult to imagine any reason for groupthink to occur when 
the President no longer has to fear checks from the legislative branch. What the MCA does, 
combined with the tradition of largely leaving foreign policy up to the executive branch, is 
giving the president the power to do anything he pleases, thus negating the need for 
concurrence within the policy-making group, and between the executive and the legislative 
branches. Though this looks like a fairly dramatic shift in the balance of power between the 
branches, it is important to remember that at the time the executive order was written there 
had been no Supreme Court action regarding the MCA, and it is likely that it still was 
expected that the Court would strike the Act down.
Section 2 of Executive Order 13440 lists several definitions for terms used later in the 
order, the most interesting definition being the definition of “cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment” in Section 2 (iv) (c). Bush defines this as the treatment or 
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punishment “prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.”37 It is understandable that this can be read as a move toward a more humane 
and legal interrogation practice since the Amendments Bush mentions give the right of due 
process and prohibits cruel and unusual treatment, but knowing that the MCA actually 
restricts enemy combatants from receiving their due process rights, and that cruel and unusual 
treatment does not include waterboarding or rape, the inclusion of this definition in the 
executive order rings hollow. If, on the other hand, the executive order is intended to move 
the CIA interrogation detention facilities toward a more humane and legal area of law, the 
inclusion of Bush’s definition again brings up the question of why this executive order exists 
at all. Even if the MCA required the order’s issuance, Bush could have used the order to 
interpret that the administration’s earlier policies had been wrong. If it had been shown that 
the CIA was able to obtain valuable information without “Gitmo-ized” interrogation 
techniques, and they from the effective date of Executive Order 13440 no longer were 
authorized to conduct interrogations which were prohibited by the new Field Manual and the 
US Constitution, there does not seem to be any reason why the Executive Order, or even the 
MCA’s provision allowing evidence obtained through coercion38 to exist at all. By including a 
definition of cruel and unusual treatment that is identical to the U.S. Constitution Bush also 
indirectly says that because he has the power to interpret the Geneva Conventions, he also has 
the power to interpret the meaning of the Constitution. If the two documents are one and the 
same regarding the definition of cruel and unusual treatment, this implies that because Bush 
has the power to interpret one of the documents’ definition, he presumably has the power to 
interpret the other.
Beginning with Section 3(a), President Bush indirectly goes against every policy the 
administration had enacted up to the point of writing, stating that: 
Pursuant to the authority of the President under the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States, including the Military Commissions Act of 2006, this order interprets 
the meaning and application of the text of Common Article 3 [of the Geneva 
Conventions] with respect to certain detentions and interrogations, and shall be 
treated as authoritative for all purposes as a matter of United States law, including 
satisfaction of the international obligations of the United States. I hereby determine 
that Common Article 3 shall apply to a program of detention and interrogation 
operated by the Central Intelligence Agency as set forth in this section. The 
requirements set forth in this section shall be applied with respect to detainees in such 
program without adverse distinction as to their race, color, religion or faith, sex, 
birth, or wealth.39
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Bush affirms yet again that he has the authority to interpret the Geneva Conventions, but 
continues by stating that the Conventions will in fact be applied to the CIA’s detention 
program, while they at the same time shall not apply to al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated 
forces as determined in Section 1 of the order. It presumably means that the Geneva 
Conventions shall apply to non-enemy combatant detainees who are not associated with, or 
members of, the Taliban or al Qaeda, but if that is the case it is hard to imagine why these 
individuals are in CIA detention facilities, and not simply in military custody receiving the 
rights of prisoners of war and remain under the protection of the Geneva Conventions in the 
first place. Again the reader is left wondering why there is a need for the executive order.
Section 3(b) (i-iv) lists a set of thirteen points which define how the CIA detention 
program will be in compliance with U.S. obligations under Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions. Section 3(b)(i) lists prohibitions of torture “as defined in section 2340 of title 18 
United States Code,”40 prohibitions of murder, biological experiments, rape, intentionally 
causing serious bodily harm, cruel and inhuman treatment, other acts of violence, denigrating 
a detainees religion, and even demands that the detention program must be in compliance with 
the Detainee Treatment Act.41 Section 3(b) (ii-iv) requires the CIA director to determine that 
the alien detainee held is a member of the Taliban, al Qaeda or associates. The key word here 
is “alien,” meaning that U.S. citizens no longer can be held by the CIA, but presumably they 
can still be held by the military as enemy combatants. The subsections also demand that the 
detainee has information that can prevent terrorist attacks or help in capturing senior Taliban 
or al Qaeda operatives, that the CIA director determines that the interrogation techniques and 
conditions of confinement used are safe, and that the detainees receive the basic necessities of 
life. Section 3(b) does exactly what the Bush critics had demanded since the Abu Ghraib 
scandal surfaced more than three years earlier, and strikes the reader as a complete reversal of 
any prior determination or policy choice up until the point of writing. Bush even demands that 
any CIA-operated detention facility is in line with the text of the DTA, a law he tried his best 
to nullify as seen in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The confusion of who will actually be detained 
by the CIA remains, as section 3(b) also outlines that the detention program only complies 
with Common Article 3 if the detainees are associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda – the 
same detainees to which Bush earlier in the same executive order reaffirms that the Geneva 
Conventions do not apply. It is baffling that the executive order demands that the CIA 
detention program should comply with legislation that does not apply to the persons who are 
to be detained under the program.
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
63
Having outlined how the detention program should be executed in order to comply 
with common article 3 President Bush directs the head of the CIA to issue written policies to 
the CIA personnel in Section 3(c) of the executive order. The written policies shall include 
directions to implement “paragraphs (i) (C), (E), and (F) of Subsection 3(b) of this order.”42
The written policies shall also include “the development of an approved plan of interrogations 
tailored for each detainee (…) consistent with subsection 3(b) (iv) of this order.”43 Bush only 
mentions four of the thirteen points outlined in Section 3(b) specifically, which can make one 
wonder why they are singled out, or why the remaining nine are omitted when directing the 
policy for the CIA detention program. The points Bush specifically mentions to be part of 
CIA policy are points on “other acts of violence serious enough to be comparable to murder 
[or] torture,”44 “willful and outrageous acts of personal abuse done for the purpose of 
humiliating or degrading the individual,”45 and “acts intended to denigrate the religion (…) of 
the individual.”46 The omitted points, which presumably are not to be included in any written 
policy issued by the CIA Director, include compliance with United States Code Title 18 
Section 2340 on torture, compliance with the MCA and the DTA on torture, the demand that 
the detainee must be determined to be associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda, and that the 
detainee must sit on important information. By carefully listing which provisions should be 
implemented, it seems that Bush indirectly suggest to the CIA Director that the omitted points 
may not be necessary in order to comply with the Geneva Conventions, even though he 
specifically lists them as important for compliance in Section 3(b). By implying that there is 
no need to implement Section 3(b) (i) (A), (B), (D), and Section 3(b) (ii-iii), there is no reason 
to include them in the order at all, except as a diversionary tactic. The omissions of any point 
explicitly prohibiting torture47 and the point demanding that the detainee must be associated 
with the Taliban or al Qaeda, the order loses all meaning barring a feeling that it is a 
roundabout way of reaffirming the status quo. Bush also wants the written policies to include 
proper training for interrogators, and an effective monitoring of the program to make sure it is 
safe,48 which is a positive step, but at the same time the omissions leave the reader with the 
feeling that Bush implies that the interrogation and detention program can be safe even 
though torture is indirectly allowed. Remembering what policy choices, and attempts to 
nullify infringements on those policies, that already have been presented in this thesis, it does 
not seem likely that Bush intended to reverse all prior policy choices with this order, 
especially with the order’s preamble in mind.
The final two sections of the order are fairly standard, with Section 4 assigning the 
Director of National Intelligence with the functions of the president with respect to the CIA 
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detention program outlined in the order, and Section 5 says that the executive order “is not 
intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at 
law or in equity, against the United States (…) or any other person,”49 which is a normal 
statement at the end of any executive order.
In summary Executive Order 13440 does in fact seem to have been issued mainly to 
affirm the status quo and potentially confuse critics, and because the MCA said that it had to 
be issued. Initially it reaffirms that al Qaeda and Taliban members, or associates are not 
protected by the Geneva Conventions, then it states that the CIA detention program shall be in 
line with the Geneva Conventions and that only prisoners associated with al Qaeda and the 
Taliban are to be “enrolled” in the program thus providing Geneva protections to only those 
who are not eligible for it. The order then quickly scraps more or less any provision that 
demands that the detention program shall be in line with Geneva and only contain detainees 
with association to al Qaeda or the Taliban. Leaving a detention program that can detain 
anyone – except U.S. citizens – and presumably torture them as long as the interrogation 
techniques and the program is deemed safe and the detainees are afforded the basic necessities 
of life. This detention program is remarkably similar to the regime that already was in place 
before the executive order was issued. The only new provision provided by the order seems to 
be a demand that the interrogators receive appropriate training. If that truly is the intention of 
the executive order, which seems remarkable at best, then it could have been done a lot easier 
and straight forward. The quotation from Philip Zelikow in the New York Times article above, 
saying that the order represented a more moral and legal direction, does not make much sense 
when reading the executive order, because it would be hard to argue that the order represents 
a break with earlier policy. However reading the New York Times article and Philip Zelikow’s 
quote they serve as an indication that many of Bush’s critics actually believed that the order 
represented a break with policy. Provided this is the case one can argue that Philip J. Cooper’s 
example of “symbolic orders” discussed in Chapter 4.2 fits very well with the analyzed order. 
Some of Bush’s critics seemed pleased with the order, but it did not provide anything new in 
practice. Not everyone was pleased with the issuance of the executive order, however, as on 
July 26, 2007 – six days after the order was issued – then Democratic senator from Illinois, 
Barack Obama spoke out against it. Obama criticized the order for being “an effort to 
obfuscate and avoid accountability on issues of vital importance to this country’s well 
being.”50 Obama continued: 
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I am deeply concerned that President Bush may now be trying to reopen the door to 
cruelty that Congress shut [with the DTA]. While the Executive order [sic] appears 
to rule out unlawful treatment, the administration has said that the order allows the 
CIA to resume at least some elements of its “enhanced interrogation” program, and 
to use methods beyond those that our military employs. The administration still 
refuses to rule out torture techniques such as waterboarding.51
Obama’s concerns are the same as this thesis argues; that the order seems to be an attempt to 
confuse critics and continue the controversial policies, rather than an attempt to change 
policies.
4.4 The Supreme Court Addresses the Military Commissions Act
The Supreme Court eventually addressed the MCA on June 12, 2008, when the Court
delivered its opinion in Boumediene v. Bush. The case was brought to the Supreme Court on 
behalf of several plaintiffs, all enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The 
petitioners contested the decision that they did not have the right to habeas corpus, as decided 
by the DTA and the MCA.52 In addressing the question Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion of the Court with Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg concurring. In the 5-
4 decision the Supreme Court found that the suspension of any court’s jurisdiction to hear 
writs of habeas corpus, or any other action against the United States from enemy combatants 
as provided for in Section 7 of the MCA53 was unconstitutional, and in turn that Section 7 of 
the MCA was unconstitutional, and that the section of the DTA setting up Combat Status 
Review Tribunals54 was an inadequate substitute for the right to habeas corpus.55 The Court 
also found that the Guantanamo Bay base, though not sovereign territory of the United States 
was under the direct control of the United States and that the territory was not exempt for the 
U.S. Constitution despite the fact that it was outside the United States, therefore the persons 
detained at the detention facilities could not be stripped of their rights under the U.S.
Constitution.56 The administration’s assertion that the base at Guantanamo was outside the 
“reach” of the U.S. Constitution was rejected by the majority opinion of the Court. In closing 
Justice Kennedy indirectly criticized President Bush and his continued insistence that any 
infringement on the executive branch’s powers in a time of war would weaken the President’s 
ability to conduct the war and keep the country safe:
Our opinion does not undermine the Executive's powers as Commander-in-Chief. 
On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is vindicated, not eroded, when 
confirmed by the Judicial Branch. Within the Constitution's separation-of-powers 
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structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the 
responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a 
person. Some of these petitioners have been in custody for six years with no 
definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention. Their access to 
the writ [of habeas corpus] is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, 
even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek.57
Kennedy touches upon a vital point, not only in relation to the balance of power between the 
branches, but also on the fate of the enemy combatants being held at Guantanamo Bay and 
elsewhere. The MCA seemed to have institutionalized the principles of the unitary executive, 
but Kennedy’s words above serve as a reminder of how important the separation of powers is 
within a democratic government. By reinstating the enemy combatants’ right to seek habeas 
corpus relief from federal courts, the Supreme Court provided them with the Constitutional 
rights the Bush administration had withheld from them for several years. The quoted passage 
above also serves as a reminder that even though the enemy combatants were determined to 
have habeas rights, they might not succeed in their challenge. What the Kennedy quotation 
and the majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush do is to remind the reader and the 
administration that no matter how “evil” or guilty a person is, a democracy does not remove 
that individual’s rights of due process of the law, after all that right is included twice in the 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, in both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.
The Boumediene verdict put an end to the question of whether the enemy combatants 
had habeas corpus privileges under the U.S. Constitution. The verdict came at a time when 
George W. Bush was moving towards lame-duck status as well. The primary season of the 
2008 election was over, and the Republican and Democratic nominees had taken over the 
political focus to a large degree. Having been struck down by the Supreme Court in both 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush, the administration had lost on two vital fronts, 
both on trying enemy combatants by military commission and on withholding habeas 
protections from them. Even though the MCA had been passed, the controversies surrounding 
its passing and the eventual decision from the Supreme Court that the Act was 
unconstitutional ended the matter.
The verdict in Boumediene is the final stage of the policy process regarding the status, 
treatment, and trial of the enemy combatants, analyzed in this thesis. The tug-of-war which 
began with the DTA in December 2005 came to an initial end in June 2008 when the Supreme 
Court found the MCA unconstitutional. In January 2009, two days after Barack Obama had 
taken office the majority of Bush’s policy choices, and definitions analyzed in this thesis was 
repealed by two executive orders, these are discussed in the next chapter.
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5.0 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to show how much power lies in the power to define, and how 
George W. Bush and his administration used their defining powers to increase executive 
power and shift the balance of power between the branches. The thesis also aimed to show 
how the administration used its defining powers to create a whole new category of prisoners 
of war, replacing all other categories, and redefine torture in order to avoid prosecution for 
using “enhanced interrogation methods.” By analyzing four central documents from the 
policy process regarding the status, treatment and trial of the prisoners taken in the War on 
Terror, and the context the documents were created in, the thesis has shown that the 
administrations made extensive use of its defining powers with significant consequences. 
The thesis also intended to test three different theories regarding the presidency to the 
presented cases to see if any of the theories could provide further insight into the policy 
making process or explain why the policy outcomes turned out as they did. The most 
important theory turned out to be Christopher S. Kelley’s theory of “the unitary executive,” 
and how that has influenced the Bush presidency,1 which proved central for understanding the 
policy choices Bush made. The two other theories are Irving L. Janis’ theory on groupthink in 
the policy-making process and David Mitchell’s theory on how the policy-making process is 
managed by the President. Both theories helped shed additional light on how some of the 
decisions were reached, but the two latter theories proved to serve more as supporting 
arguments to the investigation into the unitary executive for the purpose of this thesis.
This conclusion shows how the Bush administrations used its defining powers in three 
different policy areas, redefining presidential power, removing Geneva III protections and due 
process rights by creating enemy combatants, and what constituted torturing the enemy 
combatants. The three areas are discussed separately beginning with the expansion of 
presidential powers. The unitary executive theory proved to be intrinsically connected to the 
redefinition of presidential powers, and the theory is discussed in the first part of this 
conclusion. The conclusion then moves on to show how the administration removed Geneva 
III protections, and finally how the administration redefined torture. After the defining powers 
have been discussed, this conclusion applies the final test of the two theories on presidential 
policy making, before looking at some of the aftermath of the Bush administration’s policies, 
and what has happened after Barack Obama took office.
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5.1 Redefining Presidential Power – the Unitary Executive
By institutionalizing the principles of “the unitary executive” in the executive branch the Bush 
administration succeeded in increasing presidential powers and prerogatives. The 
administration’s insistence on adhering to and making use of unitary executive principles was 
in itself a defining power which it turns out was used with great success from the 
administration, especially for shifting the balance of power in government. 
The internal memos analyzed in Chapter 2, show how the Bush team redefined 
presidential power to include the power to interpret and even suspend treaties, such as Geneva 
III, on behalf of the nation and without Congressional consent. The opinion expressed in both 
memos serves as clear examples of “coordinate construction,” which is one of the most 
central foundations for “the unitary executive theory,” according to Kelley. The Bybee Memo 
opined that the president had the unilateral power to interpret and suspend treaties at his 
discretion, and cited Article II, Section 2b of the United States Constitution as the source of 
that power. The relevant article of the Constitution says: “He [the President] shall have power, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the 
Senators present concur,” nowhere else in Article II of the U.S. Constitution are treaties 
mentioned, and Bybee’s reading of the Article seems dubious to a critical reader. It is possible 
that Bybee’s reading of Article II, Section 2b incorporates two other clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution, the Take Care Clause (Article II, Section 3), “he shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed,” and the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, b), “this Constitution, and the 
laws of the United States (…) and all treaties made, or which shall be made (…) shall be the 
supreme law of the land.” The traditional reading of the Supremacy Clause is that United 
States federal law supersedes any form of treaty or international law, meaning that if these 
two clauses are included in the reading of Article II, Section 2 b, along with the principle of 
coordinate construction, it is possible to argue that because the President shall “take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed,” and that federal law supersedes international law, the 
president has the right to interpret international treaties – in this case Geneva III – as being 
invalid for the United States if he finds that Geneva III would be in conflict with United States 
federal law. Whether Bybee’s reading and subsequent opinion that the President has unilateral 
suspension power of any treaty, includes the Take Care -, and Supremacy Clauses is not made 
clear in the memo, and Bybee does not express the opinion that Geneva III is in conflict with 
U.S. federal law, making Bybee’s opinion on behalf of the Office of Legal Counsel 
unconvincing. Even though the Take Care Clause may be vaguely worded, it does not provide 
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for a unilateral interpretation and suspension power of treaties without Senatorial consent. 
Article II, 2b, explicitly mentions, twice, that the conduction of treaties must be done with the 
advice and consent of the Senate and Bybee’s reading is tailored to fit what the President 
wanted, while at the same time expanding presidential powers to such a degree as to make the 
Senate superfluous in foreign relations. The findings provided by this thesis indicate that 
Bybee’s definition, or rather creation, of new presidential powers rests exclusively on a 
unitary executive reading of the U.S. Constitution.
Having acted relatively unchecked for two years – from the time the memos were 
written in January 2002 – the Bush administration faced strong criticism when the prisoner 
abuse in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq became known in April 2004. When evidence that 
additional prisoner abuse had occurred in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay emerged, 
Congress responded by a passing the Detainee Treatment Act in December 2005 with the 
intention of increasing Congressional oversight, keeping a rein on the executive branch, and 
ensuring that no further prisoner abuse would occur. Using his interpretative and defining 
powers, President Bush, nullified the entire Act in three sentences by a signing statement to 
the bill, which is analyzed in Chapter 3. The signing statement decided that Congress would
not have oversight over the detention and interrogation process, as the DTA says, or have the 
ability to serve as a check on the executive because it would be an infringement on the unitary 
executive branch. Though Bush did not say so directly, his signing statement says that he will 
read the DTA “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to 
supervise the unitary executive branch.”2 Without specifying where in the Constitution this 
authority is granted the President, Bush interprets the Constitution to grant him the power in 
the same way Bybee found that the Constitution granted the President unilateral “suspension 
powers.” Additionally the signing statement – which is another commonly used tool of the 
unitary executive according to Kelley – argued that the federal judiciary would not have 
jurisdiction to enforce the Act, nor hear writs of habeas corpus from enemy combatants. The 
signing statement serves as additional proof that the administration continued to redefine not 
only executive powers, but even those of the other branches. A unilateral definition of the 
federal courts’ jurisdiction by another branch of Government creates a very disturbing 
precedent and a Constitutional problem regarding the system of checks and balances. If the 
executive branch, as Bush argues in his signing statement, has the power to define which 
cases the courts are allowed to hear, as well as the power to rebuff any Congressional 
“infringements” on the executive, there does not seem to be a need for checks and balances as 
the executive branch effectively relegates the other branches to vassals and creates a system in 
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which the “royal” unitary executive sits on top issuing decrees and defines what the others can 
and cannot do. Such an accretion of power within one branch is not only problematic in a 
constitutional democracy, but strongly warned against by one of the founding fathers, former 
president James Madison, in Federalist No. 47: “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands (…) may justly be pronounced the very definition 
of tyranny.”3 Labeling George W. Bush as a tyrant may be a bit too harsh, but by insisting on 
the principles of the unitary executive, the Bush administration expanded the executive power 
at the cost of the two other branches of government significantly, as the expanded powers 
included coordinate construction, or executive judicial review, the power to decide the courts’ 
jurisdiction, and the ability to ignore Congress. If not a tyrant in a traditional understanding of 
the word, it may be possible to argue – using James Madison’s words – that the Bush 
administration’s insistence upon defining the executive as unitary made President Bush into a 
“constitutional tyrant” ruling over the other branches of government. The Supreme Court did 
not agree to the definitions the administration insisted upon, however.
Having used his signing statement to the DTA to dispose of Congressional attempts to 
rein him in, President Bush’s intended regime of trying enemy combatants by military 
commissions was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2006 when, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
the Court found that the regime was unconstitutional as long as the administration did not get 
Congressional approval. The Supreme Court also addressed the administration’s opinion that 
the courts did not have jurisdiction to hear submissions of writs of habeas corpus from enemy 
combatants, rejecting the argument made by Bush’s signing statement as unpersuasive. The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Hamdan was the first time the unitary executive approach had 
failed the Bush administration in the War on Terror, and he was forced to ask Congress to 
continue with his policy. This was achieved in a rushed passing of the controversial Military 
Commissions Act right before the Republican Party lost control over both houses of Congress 
in the 2006 Midterm Elections. Certain provisions of the MCA further institutionalized the 
principles of the unitary executive in the U.S. government as the President’s authority to 
interpret “the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions,” was included in Section 6 
of the MCA.4 Section 6 also included a provision saying that the President would issue an 
executive order interpreting the meaning and application of Geneva III, and that the 
forthcoming executive order would be “authoritative (…) as a matter of United States law.”5
The executive order was issued in July 2007 and seemed, to many of the 
administration’s critics, to reject the earlier regime of trying and treating the enemy 
combatants, and replace it with a more legal and morally acceptable one. The executive order 
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says that the detention program outlined in the memo would be in compliance with Geneva 
III. The appearance of rejection and reform seems to be just an appearance however, and as 
this thesis has shown the executive order appears to indicate that the administration had no 
intention of catering to its critics. The executive order, which was issued more than six years 
after Bush took office, showed that the administration had held onto its beliefs and refused to 
back down on several of its controversial policies, this is exemplified by the interview Dick 
Cheney gave to ABC News in December 2008 as mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
Having failed with his attempt to remove the courts’ jurisdiction to hear writs of 
habeas corpus submitted by, or on behalf of, enemy combatants in his signing statement to the 
DTA, President Bush succeeded with the MCA, as the Act does exactly what he attempted to 
do with his signing statement in the Act’s Section 7.6 This means that Bush’s insistence on 
defining presidential powers during his first 6 years as President paid off when a Republican 
Congress accepted the unitary executive principles the administration had advocated, 
indicating how powerful Bush’s defining powers had become at that stage with respect to the 
balance between the branches of government.
The controversies surrounding the MCA’s passing, and the early attempt to amend it 
after the 2006 midterm elections indicated that the powers given the president by the MCA 
were not there to stay. Additionally, the judiciary would not accept the new presidential 
powers, and in June 2008 the 5-4 majority opinion of the Supreme Court stuck down the 
MCA as unconstitutional in Boumediene v. Bush, finding both the executive’s suspension of 
the federal courts’ jurisdiction and Section 7 of the MCA unconstitutional. 
The principles of the unitary executive guided George W. Bush and his administration 
throughout his presidency, but the increased presidential powers, which were a result of the 
Presidents interpretative and defining powers, were eventually struck down in Bush’s last year 
as President. The June 2008 verdict in Boumediene signifies the beginning of the end for the 
unitary executive’s influence over the U.S. government, at least for now. It is likely that 
George W. Bush continued to adhere to the principles for the rest of his second term, but by 
June 2008 his popularity was very low, and his status as a lame duck was confirmed as the 
nation looked forward to the 2008 presidential election between two of the Bush 
administration’s most vocal critics, John McCain who sponsored the DTA, and Barack 
Obama who spoke out against Executive Order 13440 in the Senate. Even though George W. 
Bush ended his presidency without many of the powers he had obtained during his 
presidency, there is little doubt that his power to define presidential powers, guided by the 
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unitary executive theory, was of great significance for the United States government in the 
years between January 20, 2001 and January 20, 2009.  
5.1.1 A New Imperial Presidency?
Bush’s success in redefining presidential powers was largely due to his insistence on the 
principles of the unitary executive, and how he chose to run his administration, but there are 
additional factors which can help in explaining what happened. In The New Imperial 
Presidency, Andrew Rudalevige argues that the expansion of powers by the executive came 
as a result of the situation presented in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, and that the other branches of government, especially Congress, failed to check the 
executive.7 Rudalevige’s argument is that the balance of power shifted back to what it was 
during the Vietnam War and before Watergate, meaning that the Bush administration 
increased executive power significantly. The reason for this increase is a combination of the 
unilateral claims made by the Bush administration, the external event of 9/11, and an 
“invisible Congress.”8 The invisible Congress is evinced in part by the lack of presidential 
vetoes in 2003 and 2004 according to Rudalevige,9 but it is important to remember that 
Bush’s extensive use of presidential signing statements lessened the need for vetoes, as Bush 
could simply state that he would ignore the provisions he disagreed with. For a very 
considerable part of his presidency, however, Congress went along with these signing 
statements. There seems to be little doubt that Congress was uncharacteristically timid in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks, in part because disagreeing with the President might be 
perceived as “unpatriotic,” a label which would not sit well with the electorate before the 
upcoming midterm election in 2002.
The situation which presented itself to the administration after the terrorist attacks was 
not the excuse the administration needed, however, as Rudalevige argues that: “even before 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration asserted a wide range of 
unilateral claims.”10 The reason for these unilateral claims seems in part to be influenced by 
what Vice President Dick Cheney perceived as “a constant, steady erosion of the prerogatives 
and the powers of the president”11 that had occurred during his 35 years in Washington D.C.
Knowing that the unitary executive theory was popular in conservative circles, and that Bush 
had surrounded himself with “neo-cons” who believed that the presidency was “under attack” 
by the other branches of government, it seems likely that the terrorist attacks only eased the 
process of redefining presidential powers in line with the principles of the unitary executive, 
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and that the administration would have attempted to redefine presidential powers regardless of 
the terrorist attacks.
The erosion of “executive prerogatives” Cheney complained about, and the 
administration’s attempt to regain these prerogatives through the use of the unitary executive 
principles strengthens the image of a “royal executive,” or an imperial presidency. Rudalevige 
believes that we will continue to see aggressive claims to power made by future presidents,12
but whether that is the case remains uncertain at the time of writing, as Obama’s presidency 
has just passed its first 100 days.
5.2 Redefining Prisoners of War and Torture
The defining powers employed by the administration not only had dramatic consequences for 
the balance of power within the United States government, but proved to have significant 
consequences for the prisoners taken by, or handed over to, the United States military and the 
CIA in the years after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The administration was 
quick to remove any protections provided the prisoners by the Geneva Conventions and 
shortly thereafter the administration created the term enemy combatant. Initially the 
administration intended a clear separation between lawful enemy combatants, and unlawful 
enemy combatants, but the distinction seemed to blur as time went by. The most immediate 
ramification for the enemy combatants were that the administration argued that they could be 
held as long as the War on Terror was ongoing, an argument critics interpreted as meaning the 
enemy combatants could be held indefinitely. Later the choice to “Gitmo-ize” interrogation 
procedures resulted in several of the enemy combatants being subjected to treatment that 
constituted torture, or at least treatment which was tantamount to torture, the administration, 
however, insisted that the treatment was not torture, merely “enhanced interrogation 
methods.”
5.2.1 Removing Due Process Rights and Geneva III Protections
The memos analyzed in Chapter 2 defined presidential powers to include a unilateral power to 
determine that any prisoner taken in a theater of armed conflict, or war, could be determined 
not to be prisoners of war without a status review, as common article 5 of the Geneva 
Conventions calls for, or input from the judicial branch. The ramifications this increase of 
presidential powers had for the soon to be enemy combatants were that they would not be 
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provided with the protections and rights provided by the Geneva Conventions, and the U.S. 
Constitution. Having ordered that the prisoners taken would be tried by military commissions 
in the military order of November 13, 2001, Bush removed the prisoners’ due process rights 
they were entitled to in the Constitution. This turned out to have devastating results for 
several of the prisoners held in the prison facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in secret 
CIA prisons around the world, as some of the enemy combatants were held in solitary 
confinement for years without being presented with charges of any crime apart from their 
status as enemy combatants.
After the administration had created a new status definition for the detainees, having 
“dug out” a term which critics have labeled as legally meaningless and which had only been 
used once before in United States judicial history, the administration was able to replace the 
terms found in the Geneva Conventions – lawful combatant, unlawful combatant, and 
innocent or civilian – with their brand new definition, a definition which incidentally removed 
all due process rights and legal protections as long as president Bush used his unilateral power 
to define the prisoners as enemy combatants.
When Congress tried to set up a system of Status Review Tribunals in the Detainee 
Treatment Act in 2005, Bush’s signing statement discarded the Act, and the Supreme Court 
had to intervene, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in order to compel the administration to ask 
Congress if it could proceed with trying the enemy combatants by military commission. The 
result of the administration’s cooperation with Congress was the MCA which left the 
unlawful enemy combatants who were not U.S. citizens in the same situation they had been 
prior to the Hamdan verdict. The MCA also allowed secret evidence, and evidence obtained 
through coercion – meaning that evidence obtained through “enhanced interrogation 
methods” would not be disallowed in the military commission trials.
The initial distinction between lawful enemy combatant and unlawful enemy 
combatant seems to have disappeared as in June, 2007, two separate military commissions on 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, refused to hear the cases of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the enemy 
combatant lending his name to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr 
because the two prisoners had only been defined as “enemy combatants,” not “unlawful 
enemy combatants” by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal.13 The military commissions 
refused to hear the cases because the MCA explicitly stated that “[a]ny alien unlawful enemy 
combatant is subject to trial by military commission,”14 and since Hamdan, and Khadr were 
only determined to be “enemy combatants” the military commissions decided they did have 
the jurisdiction to hear the cases.15 Hamdan was eventually convicted of material support for 
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terrorism and sentenced to an effective sentence of four months in August 2008. He was 
repatriated to his native Yemen in December 2008 where he would serve the final month of 
his sentence.16
The policy choice regarding the prisoners’ status was begun in the two memos 
analyzed in Chapter 2, furthered by labeling the prisoners as enemy combatants, and remained 
throughout the Bush presidency despite attempts by Congress and the Supreme Court to better 
the legal standing of the detainees. The main reason for the continued policy was Bush’s 
interpretative and defining powers working at full speed to avoid infringements on the 
decided upon policy.
5.2.2 Defining Torture
What may have been worst for the enemy combatants was how the administration defined 
“torture.” The Gonzales Memo, analyzed in Chapter 2, opined that “inhumane treatment,” as 
the War Crimes Act prohibits, was vague wording and that it would be hard to predict what 
treatment would violate this prohibition. At the same time Gonzales said that, if he understood 
correctly, Bush had decided that the prisoners would be treated humanely, which seems like 
somewhat of a contradiction to an outsider. What the Abu Ghraib scandal showed was that the 
prisoners were not treated humanely at all, and the horrifying treatment which emerged in the 
scandal was from a prison in Iraq, done to prisoners who, likely, were not members of al 
Qaeda or the Taliban. The treatment inflicted upon prisoners in Abu Ghraib was presumably 
the result of Donald Rumsfeld’s calling for the “Gitmo-ization” of interrogation techniques, 
indicating that the treatment was going on in the facilities at Guantanamo Bay as well. The 
Abu Ghraib scandal initiated a debate of whether or not waterboarding constituted torture, but 
the administration insisted that it did not, nor was it presumably a violation of the U.S. 
Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. The administration’s definition 
of torture was based on the opinion of the OLC as enunciated in the Bybee Torture Memo 
where Bybee concluded that 
[F]or an act to constitute torture, it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. 
Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily 
function, or even death.17
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How an interrogator can measure when the intensity of pain he causes reaches what 
accompanies organ failure or death is not apparent. The Bybee Torture Memo was scrapped 
by the OLC after the Abu Ghraib scandal, but it was the governing definition for over two 
years.
The debate of whether waterboarding constitutes torture is still not settled, and as the 
introduction to this thesis mentions, Dick Cheney does not believe waterboarding is torture 
while another former Bush official disagrees with Cheney. In an interview with Al Jazeera 
English, the former Deputy Secretary of State under Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, said 
that waterboarding was torture.18 Armitage’s opinion is supported by humanitarian 
organizations like the Human Rights Watch as this thesis has shown. With regard to 
waterboarding, the Bush administration chose to define the act of pouring water onto a cloth 
covering a detainees head to simulate drowning as not constituting torture, not even when 
used 183 times in one month on the same prisoner, as was done to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed 
in March 2003.19 Keeping in mind that not all enemy combatants were innocents, and that 
some of them, like Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, posed a very real danger to the United States, 
it still seems unfathomable that simulating drowning on a prisoner at an average of 6 times a 
day for a month is necessary regardless of the danger the prisoner and the knowledge he 
possesses, may turn out to pose. There also seem to be evidence that such harsh interrogation 
methods were unnecessary, as evinced by CIA officials admitting that the CIA detainee Abd 
al-Hadi al-Iraqi had provided valuable intelligence despite him not being exposed to harsh 
interrogation techniques, and by experts who argue that torture does not work as described in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. There are also examples of torture occurring without the detainee 
being subjected to one specific treatment, like waterboarding, but rather a series of different 
treatments that in sum caused severe harm. One such example is the treatment Mohammed al-
Qahtani was subjected to, and which a military judge reviewing practices at Guantanamo Bay, 
Susan Crawford, concluded constituted torture.20 Qahtani was subjected to humiliating 
treatment and insults for 18-20 hours a day for the better part of two months causing him to be 
hospitalized two times. Crawford had no illusions about the danger Qahtani presented to the 
United States, as she was certain that he would have contributed to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks had he not been refused entry into the United States. Despite the danger Qahtani posed 
Crawford refused to refer Qahtani’s case for prosecution because her conclusion was that he 
was tortured during interrogations.21
Seemingly unperturbed by the controversies caused by the Abu Ghraib scandal, 
President Bush discarded former prisoner of war and torture victim John McCain’s attempt to 
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put an end to the maltreatment, when using his signing statement to the DTA to nullify the 
Act. The reports of maltreatment that surfaced during the Abu Ghraib scandal indicated that 
some prisoners were raped during interrogations,22 but the administration and Congress were 
still able to include a provision in the MCA rejecting that rape constituted torture. This 
signifies that the administration held an extremely narrow definition of torture, and was more 
concerned with “actionable evidence,” than the prisoner’s well being. President Bush’s
Executive Order, analyzed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, seemed to cater to the administration’s 
critics with regard to the treatment the enemy combatants were subjected to, but this thesis 
has shown that not everyone was pleased with the order, nor does it seem that the order was 
intended to actually change policy in any significant way. 
Whether or not Bush’s definition of torture was “correct” or not does not really matter 
in the end, as the consequences for the enemy combatants were the same. By using his 
defining powers the President of the United States decided that the prisoners taken in the War 
on Terror would lose all the protections the Geneva Conventions normally would have 
provided. The prisoners lost their due process rights, some were held without charges for 
several years – often in isolation with their only human contact being with their interrogators 
– some were subjected to humiliating and harmful treatments causing them to need 
hospitalization, and some were waterboarded on a daily basis over several weeks. There is no 
doubt that the power to define had extremely harmful consequences for many prisoners taken 
in the War on Terror whether they were dangerous or not.
5.3 Groupthink and the Advisory Systems Framework
In addition to testing the unitary executive theory this thesis tests two other theories on policy 
making to see if they can shed light on the policy-making process analyzed here. Irving L. 
Janis’ theory on groupthink provided a degree of understanding with regard to how the policy
making group was influenced by its members in order to achieve concurrence regardless of 
the policy result. David Mitchell’s Advisory Systems Framework provided some insight as 
well, but to a much smaller degree than the unitary executive and groupthink. The main use 
for Mitchell’s theory proved to be as an addendum to explaining the degree of groupthink 
found in the analysis. The two theories are similar in how they both discuss the lack of 
conflict, and presence of a concurrence-seeking mentality within the policy making group, 
which causes the two theories to reinforce one another to a degree in spite of the fact that their 
intended conclusions are different.
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
80
Several of the symptoms of groupthink Janis’ lists were found in the documents 
analyzed in this thesis. All of the different types of symptoms Janis lists, overestimations of 
the group, closed-mindedness, and pressures towards conformity were present. Chapter 2 
indicates that there was a pressure to conform to the policy President Bush had decided upon, 
though there is not evidence that the pressure was applied directly to the dissenters in the 
State Department, but rather by Gonzales relegating the opposing views making the dissent 
less apparent. Gonzales relegation of Powell’s dissent is also an example of Mitchell’s 
argument for how a formal system in ASF works – that conflict is either discouraged, or takes 
place on a level below the president. The policy outcome produced by the Bybee and 
Gonzales memos conforms to what Mitchell calls a dominant-subset solution, meaning that 
the conflict takes place on a level below the President, in this case between the Department of 
Justice and the Department of State, before the conflicting opinions are presented for the 
president to make the final decision.23 Gonzales presents both the DOJ’s original opinion 
from the Bybee Memo, and Colin Powell’s dissent, but he gears his own opinion towards the 
policy choice the President had already made, in an attempt to appeal to the President’s 
preference.
The most obvious symptoms of groupthink in the Gonzales memo is the unquestioned 
belief that the policy Bush has chosen is the right thing to do, causing the administration to 
seemingly ignore the moral and ethical consequences of the choice. Even though Gonzales 
considers Powell’s dissenting opinion, he concludes that the dissent is not correct, and what 
the President has chosen is unproblematic, because Bush has stated that the prisoners will be 
treated humanely. This belief seems to remain within the administration throughout the policy 
process as the administration continued its insistence on non-application of Geneva III, that 
the enemy combatants had no due process rights, and the indirect argument that the 
administration could treat the enemy combatants any way they pleased since what was done 
to the combatants was not torture. The different documents analyzed in this thesis do not 
indicate that there were no discussions within the administration regarding the morality of 
what they were doing, and it is likely that such discussions took place, but the final policy 
outcome was never changed in spite of attempts by Congress and the Supreme Court to halt 
the administration and criticism from human rights organizations. George W. Bush promoted 
himself as a moral leader with Christian values, and it seems unlikely that a leader who put so 
much emphasis on morals and whose favorite philosopher is Jesus Christ, would put his name 
to policies he saw as immoral. That makes it more likely that the administration believed what 
they did was necessary and moral, in order to protect the United States from the evil terrorists 
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held by the military and the CIA. If that is the case then another symptom of groupthink is 
present – the stereotyping of the enemy as too evil to warrant a negotiation of policy. The 
symptom is present in Gonzales’ memo where Gonzales believes that al Qaeda and the 
Taliban will not adhere to their Geneva III obligations, and the policy outcome on enemy 
combatants indicate that the belief remained throughout the Bush presidency.
Another indication of groupthink is that President Bush replaced two of the most 
polarized figures in his administration during his second term. By replacing Colin Powell with 
Condoleezza Rice, and Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates he got an administration that 
would be more likely to agree, thus reinforcing group consensus. David Mitchell describes 
several early conflicts between Powell and Rumsfeld during Bush’s first term24 and by 
replacing them Bush conforms to Mitchell’s assertion that conflict was discouraged within the 
Bush administration. One may argue that replacing Powell caused the policy process to 
conform to a final symptom of groupthink indirectly, as Janis includes a point in which the 
group may direct pressure on a member who does not conform to the group’s stereotypes and 
illusions.25 However this may also be an example of “conceptual stretching,” as warned 
against by Mitchell, because it is hard to argue that directing pressure on a member of the 
group, and replacing said member amounts to the same thing.
Having found a number of the symptoms Janis lists as being needed to conclude that 
groupthink occurred, this thesis needs to test the findings against the numerous prerequisites 
Janis demands. When asking the four key questions needed to conclude that groupthink 
occurred, this thesis can not answer with an affirmation to all of them. First, one of the key 
questions is whether the antecedent conditions were present, and this thesis has shown that the 
antecedent conditions for groupthink can not readily be said to have been present in the policy 
process. Secondly, if Mitchell is to be believed, the final say in the policy process belonged to 
the President having been presented with the available options, so it is the President and not 
the group members who essentially made the decisions, this also conforms to the unitary 
executive as Kelley’s theory states that it stems from the belief that the President must have 
complete control over the executive branch. Third it is not readily apparent whether the policy 
process was influenced by what Janis calls defective decision-making, though it may be 
argued that there was an incomplete survey of alternatives, or a failure to reappraise rejected 
alternatives, this thesis can not conclude that the policy-making procedures were defective. 
The group members and decisions made in the policy process may not have been perfect, as 
the results show, but to call the process defective, using Janis’ list of symptoms for defective 
decision making would be incorrect in the context of this thesis. The final key question Janis 
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asks is whether one can find symptoms of groupthink, something that this thesis has done, but 
as this is the only key question that can be answered positively it is likely that Janis would 
argue that the policy making process regarding the enemy combatants was not a victim of 
groupthink. What can be argued however is that the unitary executive influenced the Bush 
administration to such a degree that the symptoms of groupthink, and the way Bush managed 
the decision making process may have been results of how much merit George W. Bush 
afforded the unitary executive. Whether one can say that the policy making process was 
influenced by a degree of groupthink, or that it was influenced to some degree by groupthink, 
can be argued. If one applies the strict standards Janis outlines, the answer would be that they 
were not, but there is no doubt that the policy making process was influenced by a 
concurrence-seeking mentality.
5.4 Aftermath:  From Bush to Obama
On January 15, 2009 President George W. Bush held his last speech as president to the nation, 
and in his farewell address he spoke about how there had been debate about many of his 
decisions, but said there could be little debate about the results. “America has gone more than 
seven years without another terrorist attack on our soil,”26 said Bush and continued “[a]round 
the world, America is promoting human liberty, human rights, and human dignity.”27 The 
analysis provided in this thesis shows that the promotion of human rights and dignity may not 
be as obvious as Bush says. The enemy combatants were not treated with respect to their 
rights or dignity, and the pronouncement may sound hollow to the critics of the Bush 
administration. Bush’s argument that the results of his policies were successful since there 
have been no new terrorist attacks on the United States is a logical fallacy, as it is impossible 
to prove that something would or would not have occurred had he decided to avoid torturing 
enemy combatants and provided them with the rights many of them were entitled to. There 
have been no new terrorist attacks, but there have not been any proof that it was necessary to 
use waterboarding on Khalid Shaikh Mohammed 183 times to prevent a terrorist attack either. 
Dick Cheney intends to counter that argument however, as he called for the release of 
classified memos detailing the success of the interrogation process, to help the public 
understand how important the intelligence gathered was for the United States.28 Until this is 
done the administration’s critics is unlikely to judge the Bush legacy any differently than this 
thesis does.
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Barack Obama ran an election campaign based on two central keywords, ‘hope’ and 
‘change,’ and his landslide victory in the 2008 election provided him with the mandate for 
change he needed. In his inaugural address he directed a stab at his predecessor saying: 
As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and 
our ideals. Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine, 
drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded 
by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give 
them up for expedience's sake.29
President Obama clearly believed that the policies the Bush administration had enacted were 
in direct conflict with the ideals of the United States, and that they were not necessary in order 
to keep the country safe. He followed up on his point only two days after his inauguration 
when he signed two executive orders which reversed every single policy choice, and legal 
interpretation the Bush administration had made after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001. The first executive order called, “Executive Order 13491 - Ensuring Lawful 
Interrogations,” revokes Executive Order 13440, which is analyzed in chapter 4 of this thesis, 
and every executive directive, order and regulation, inconsistent with Executive Order 13491, 
issued between September 11, 2001 and January 20, 2009.30 The second order Obama issued 
was “Executive Order 13492 – Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities.”31 The executive order calls 
for an immediate review of all the detainees in the facilities at Guantanamo Bay,32 and halts 
all trials by military commissions which are ongoing under the MCA until this status review 
is complete.33 The order also affirms that all current detainees at GTMO have a constitutional 
right to submit a writ of habeas corpus,34 calls for the closure of the detention facilities at 
GTMO within one year of the President singing the executive order,35 that the detainees will 
be transferred to their home countries, a third country, another United States detention 
facility, or released depending on their review,36 and that the detainees shall be afforded all 
the protections provided by the Geneva Conventions.37 In addition to the two executive orders 
the Obama administration has scrapped the term “enemy combatant,” according to the 
Department of Justice.38 It is staggering how easily President Obama overturns the policies of 
the Bush administration simply by issuing two executive orders. This is another indication 
that the power of definition may have far reaching consequences, by defining the old policies 
as wrong, and employing his own definition, Obama reversed almost everything Bush’s and 
his administration have done with respect to interrogation programs and the enemy 
combatants.
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Knowing that Obama ran his campaign on a message of change, the reversals of 
Bush’s policies are unsurprising as Obama needed to make a clear distinction between the old 
administration’s policies and his own, but they are not the only changes which have occurred 
since Obama took office. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said that the term “War on 
Terror” is no longer used in Obama’s administration,39 and the CIA has announced that it will 
close down its secret prison facilities around the world.40 In the months after Obama took 
office other former Bush officials have spoken out against the former regime. As described 
above, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said that he believed 
waterboarding constituted torture, and in March 2009 Lawrence B. Wilkerson, the former 
Chief-of-staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, revealed that many of the detainees held at 
Guantanamo Bay were innocent, but they were kept in detention in the hope that they knew 
something of importance, regardless of their innocence.41 If what Wilkerson says is true, the 
announcement Bush made in his farewell address that the United States was promoting human 
rights, liberty and dignity is an outright lie. It is interesting to note, however, that several of 
the ex-officials who now speak out against the administration were employed in the State 
Department under Colin Powell, who was the lone dissenter early in the policy process. Even 
if this thesis is unable to conclude that groupthink occurred, it can say with a fair amount of 
certainty that even if groupthink had occurred, the State Department was not involved in it.
The most recent development regarding the MCA came in March 2009, when a new 
bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, the “Terrorist Detainees Procedures Act 
of 2009” (H.R. 1315 of the 111th Congress), sponsored by Adam Schiff (D-CA) will if its 
passed repeal the MCA.42 At the time of writing the bill has only gotten as far as being 
referred to committee, but if the bill eventually succeeds another piece of Bush’s controversial 
policy will be reversed.
5.5 Epilogue – Report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
During the days the conclusion of this thesis was written the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence released a report titled “OLC opinions on the CIA Detention and Interrogation 
Program.”43 The report was begun in August 2008 by then Chairman of the Committee, John 
D. Rockefeller IV, in an attempt to provide an “unclassified narrative” of the different 
opinions the OLC issued between 2002 and 2007 with regard to the CIA’s detention and 
interrogation program,44 the report was not unclassified until April 17, 2009 by Attorney 
General Eric Holder.45 The report provides an interesting overview of the different opinions 
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
85
the OLC gave on different interrogation techniques and the legality of their use by the CIA, 
mentioning among other things how waterboarding was deemed as a lawful technique on July 
26, 200246 because it did not inflict physical harm or pain, and therefore would not likely to 
cause “severe physical pain or suffering,” under Section 2340A of Title 18 of the United 
States code.47 The OLC continued to review different statutes, but continued to conclude that 
the use of “enhanced interrogation methods,” including waterboarding, was not illegal under 
the abovementioned statute, the WCA, the Geneva Conventions or the Convention Against 
Torture. In spite of the OLC’s opinion the report reveals that the CIA only used 
waterboarding on three prisoners, and discontinued its use in 2004, despite reassurances that it 
was legal.48 This means that waterboarding was discontinued as an interrogation technique by 
the CIA presumably as a response to the Abu Ghraib scandal, and revelations that 
waterboarding was used. This does not seem to have dissuaded the top officials in the Bush
administration, like Dick Cheney, from continuing to insist that it was legal, and that 
waterboarding was not torture.
The end of the report gives an overview of the developments of the law on 
interrogation practices mentioning several of the pieces of legislation and Supreme Court 
cases analyzed and referred to in this thesis, the Detainee Treatment Act, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the Military Commissions Act and Executive Order 13440, are brought up when 
discussing the developments the Bush administration made on its interrogation policy.49
Without going into great details regarding the different pieces of legislation, but rather 
concentrating on how the OLC interpreted different types of interrogation, and how the OLC 
helped in forming the legislation in response to Hamdan, the report serves as valuable insight 
into the policy process regarding the enemy combatants and how they were interrogated. The 
report may also serve as a starting point for further studies on the subject begun in this thesis, 
or as the starting point for a more in-depth analysis on how the OLC influenced policies 
during the Bush presidency.
5.5.1 Ali al-Marri
The final paragraph of Chapter 4.1 mentioned the case of Qatari national Ali al-Marri, and 
how he was facing a civil trial in Illinois after several years of being held as an enemy 
combatant. On Thursday April 30, 2009, al-Marri admitted that he was a terrorist and that he 
was working with al-Qaeda, in the U.S. District Court. He will be sentenced on July 30, 2009, 
and faces a potential 15 years in prison.50
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Appendix
Executive Order 13440
“Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of 
Detention and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency”
July 20, 2007
By the authority vested in me as President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (Public Law 107-40), the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-366), 
and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. General Determinations. (a) The United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Members of al Qaeda were responsible for the attacks on 
the United States of September 11, 2001, and for many other terrorist attacks, including against the 
United States, its personnel, and its allies throughout the world. These forces continue to fight the 
United States and its allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, and they continue to plan additional 
acts of terror throughout the world. On February 7, 2002, I determined for the United States that 
members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces are unlawful enemy combatants who are not 
entitled to the protections that the Third Geneva Convention provides to prisoners of war. I hereby 
reaffirm that determination.
(b) The Military Commissions Act defines certain prohibitions of Common Article 3 for United States 
law, and it reaffirms and reinforces the authority of the President to interpret the meaning and 
application of the Geneva Conventions.
Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this order:
(a) "Common Article 3" means Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
(b) "Geneva Conventions" means:
(i)     the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114);
(ii)     the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217);
(iii)     the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 
(6 UST 3316); and
(iv)     the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva 
August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516).
(c) "Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane 
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States.
Sec. 3. Compliance of a Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program with 
Common Article 3. (a) Pursuant to the authority of the President under the Constitution and the laws 
of the United States, including the Military Commissions Act of 2006, this order interprets the 
The Power of Definition Spring 2009 Lars Erik Aspaas
89
meaning and application of the text of Common Article 3 with respect to certain detentions and 
interrogations, and shall be treated as authoritative for all purposes as a matter of United States law, 
including satisfaction of the international obligations of the United States. I hereby determine that 
Common Article 3 shall apply to a program of detention and interrogation operated by the Central
Intelligence Agency as set forth in this section. The requirements set forth in this section shall be 
applied with respect to detainees in such program without adverse distinction as to their race, color, 
religion or faith, sex, birth, or wealth.
(b) I hereby determine that a program of detention and interrogation approved by the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency fully complies with the obligations of the United States under Common 
Article 3, provided that:
(i)     the conditions of confinement and interrogation practices of the program do not include:
     (A) torture, as defined in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code;
     (B) any of the acts prohibited by section 2441(d) of title 18, United States Code, including murder, 
torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, mutilation or maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, 
rape, sexual assault or abuse, taking of hostages, or performing of biological experiments;
     (C) other acts of violence serious enough to be considered comparable to murder, torture, 
mutilation, and cruel or inhuman treatment, as defined in section 2441(d) of title 18, United States 
Code;
     (D) any other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment prohibited by the 
Military Commissions Act (subsection 6(c) of Public Law 109-366) and the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 (section 1003 of Public Law 109-148 and section 1403 of Public Law 109-163);
     (E) willful and outrageous acts of personal abuse done for the purpose of humiliating or degrading 
the individual in a manner so serious that any reasonable person, considering the circumstances, would 
deem the acts to be beyond the bounds of human decency, such as sexual or sexually indecent acts 
undertaken for the purpose of humiliation, forcing the individual to perform sexual acts or to pose 
sexually, threatening the individual with sexual mutilation, or using the individual as a human shield; 
or
     (F) acts intended to denigrate the religion, religious practices, or religious objects of the individual;
(ii)     the conditions of confinement and interrogation practices are to be used with an alien detainee 
who is determined by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency:
     (A) to be a member or part of or supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated organizations; and
     (B) likely to be in possession of information that:
          (1) could assist in detecting, mitigating, or preventing terrorist attacks, such as attacks within the 
United States or against its Armed Forces or other personnel, citizens, or facilities, or against allies or 
other countries cooperating in the war on terror with the United States, or their armed forces or other 
personnel, citizens, or facilities; or
          (2) could assist in locating the senior leadership of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces;
(iii)     the interrogation practices are determined by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
based upon professional advice, to be safe for use with each detainee with whom they are used; and
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(iv)     detainees in the program receive the basic necessities of life, including adequate food and water, 
shelter from the elements, necessary clothing, protection from extremes of heat and cold, and essential 
medical care.
(c) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall issue written policies to govern the program, 
including guidelines for Central Intelligence Agency personnel that implement paragraphs (i)(C), (E), 
and (F) of subsection 3(b) of this order, and including requirements to ensure:
(i)     safe and professional operation of the program;
(ii)     the development of an approved plan of interrogation tailored for each detainee in the program 
to be interrogated, consistent with subsection 3(b)(iv) of this order;
(iii)     appropriate training for interrogators and all personnel operating the program;
(iv)     effective monitoring of the program, including with respect to medical matters, to ensure the 
safety of those in the program; and
(v)     compliance with applicable law and this order.
Sec. 4. Assignment of Function. With respect to the program addressed in this order, the function of 
the President under section 6(c)(3) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 is assigned to the 
Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, this order is not intended to, 
and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, 
against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any 
other person.
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to prevent or limit reliance upon this order in a civil, 
criminal, or administrative proceeding, or otherwise, by the Central Intelligence Agency or by any 
individual acting on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency in connection with the program 
addressed in this order.
George W. Bush
The White House,
July 20, 2007.
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